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ABSTRACT
This study is concerned with corporate policy on IllV/AIDS. This was investigated by
speaking to key-informants from fifteen enterprises in KwaZulu Natal. They were asked
about their policies and programmes and what they had put in place to combat this
epidemic. The rational choice model was used as a framework for analysis ofthe policies.
This model is discussed in the first part ofthe study and was chosen as it seems to reflect
the dominant policy outlook in South Africa and may shape the way that organisations
.respond.
The second part of the project is the report and discussion of the findings. It is a
presentation ofthe responses given by the key informants regarding their perceptions and
understanding of the problem of IllV/AIDS as well as the policies .of their companies
regarding the same. Mostof the companies in the study did not have policies specific to.
IDV/AIDS. Some had general guidelines and treated HIV/AIDS as any major illness.
There seemed to be denial, especially among the management, of the seriousness of the
disease despite evidence of its significant impact within the various organisations. There
were few to no resources set aside for mv/AIDS programmes and interventions and this
seems important in defining the IllV/AIDS problem as one of the future rather than the
present
In the third part of this project, the theoretical framework and the findings were linked.
There was an attempt to answer the question ofhow rational the policy process is within
the companies in the study and .whether the responses of these organisations can be
understood in the context ofthe rational choice model. It seems that this model does aid
in understanding of the policy process when there is a realisation· that it interacts with
other human mctors to create what we observe.
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INTRODUCITON
This study uses the rational choice model as the framework for analysis ofcorporate
policy on lllV/AIDS. This particular model is used to try and understand the approach
taken by fifteen enterprises in KwaZulu Natal in response to the lllV/AIDS epidemic.
The lllV/AIDS issue is becoming an increasingly important one as it continues to have
an impact on, among other aspects of life, the economy and the labour market. It is---predicted that labour supply will be affected by an anticipated decline in productivity due
~ --
to absenteeism- time tak~n offas sick leave or to attend funeral services. This means that
companies will face higher costs associated with factors such as lower productivity,
replacement ofworkers, benefit payments and ensuring occupational health and safety
standards. These are some ofthe effects that the disease will have. "At the end of
1998... in the most hit province, Kwazulu Natal, prevalence rates were as high as 33%.
Already, by 1991, locally developed and reliable modelling work had established the
. .
potential for a serious lllV epidemic in South Africa." (Schneider and Stein, 2000: 3).
It is clear then that this is an important issue and that it is worthwhile to investigate
corporate policy on HIV/AIDS intervention in order to have an idea ofwhat some
cOmpanies are doing. Also, whether or not the interventions and programnies that are in
place are effective and enough is being done to combat this disease or at least to limit its
negative effects. It is for this purpose that this study is carried out. Moreover, to place the.
actions taken by these companies within the context ofthe rational choice model.
Face to face semi- structured questionnaires were administered to key informants nom
fifteen purposefully chosen business organisations in and around Pietennaritzburg. The
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questionnaire dealt with the understanding ofHIV/AIDS as a problem as well as with the
policies and guidelines that were in place to de8l with the disease. Another question dealt
with resources. The key informants were asked·whether their companies had set aside any -
resources forthe realisation oftheir IDV/AIDS policies or interventions. They were also
asked whether they thought that their policies were up to the task ofkeeping their
organisations in business in face ofthe projections of the effects of the disease.
The problem ofmY/AIDS is serious one. The infection rate among the economically
active population in South Africa is predicted to peak at 22% in 2006 compared to an
estimated peak ofaround 16% for the total population. (Quattek, Ing Barings, 2000: 13).
In light ofthese projections it is important for business to formulate strategies to cope
with this scenario. This study tries to answer the question ofwhat some organisations are
doing in this regard. This project is an effort to use the rational choice model to analyse
the response ofbusiness to the mY/AIDS epidemic. It tries to point out some ofthe
limits to rationality that these organisations face in their attempts to respond. The model-
is also taken in conjunction with other huinan factors such as perception and definition of







''Employers oftoday find there are an ever increasing number ofsocial burdens placed on
them. Although the law does not require an employer to develop a workplace AIDS
policy and programme, to do so makes good business sense and makes for good labour
relations. It gives a clear message to the workforce that the employer is committed to
social issues,· enables employees to protect themselves against possible infection,
provides the employer with an opportunity to plan for the impact of mY/AIDS and
allows for the minimising of the impact of the epidemic." (Smart, AIDS Analysis Africa,
.Jun/Jul 1999 pg. 6). "The moralistic overtones of prevention messages and AIDS
workers' rhetoric have an alienating effect, allowing people to deflect the disease onto the
Other. Consequently, we see a population that is manifestly aware of AIDS - to the poip.t
of being bored, dismissive and fatalistic - but that lacks the conceptual tools for effective
behavioural and attitudinal changes. (Marais, 2000: 10), It has unfortuilately not been the
case thatavailability ofand exposure to the information regarding mv and AIDS has led
to rational behaviour on the part of the population. Fredland writes in AIDS Analysis
Africa. "Cultural values such as fatalism, fumily responsibility, economic
responsibilities, the cultural role ofin~yand·traditic:>ns; play ai least as large a role in
AIDS education as do epidemiological considerations. Consequently, policy must· be
developed and coordinated among donors, whether they be United Nations organs, the
Red Cross, c:>I: church. agencies. And almost never can the message be effectively
delivered by a non native to the culture." (Fredland, 1994: 7).
Policy- making and implementation are complex processes that do not automatically
follow a rational model. It makes sense to focus on the rational model because this model
of policy making has been sometimes used to illuminate national policy and it may also
shape the way that organizations respond to various issues. " The study of policy
. indicates the complexity of the policy process. Its elements may be described as an
· environmental system from which demands and needs arise and upon which policy seeks
to have an effect; a political system in which policy decisions are made; an organizational
system through which policy is mediated and executed." (Batrettand Fudge, 1981: 2). A
key question is whether or not the rational model assists in making effective policy or
aids us in our understanding ofnational policy.
The rational model ofpolicy analysis includes as some ofits key techniques; cost benefit
analysis, economic forecasting and social indicators." Although there are quite a few
variants on what has been tenned the model·of rational choice....most models ofdecision
making. under comprehensive rationality are based on three fundamental assumptions.
Firs~ all possible states of the world mcing decision - makers can be ranked in regard to
desirability. Second, decision- makers know the connection between the strategies they
may choose from the desired goals, or evaluated states of the world. Third, decision-
makers optimise. That is, they choose the strategy that brings about the largest total
amount ofsatismction to them (which is the best state ofthe world discounted by the cost
of the strategies that can be used to bring it aboutD" (Jones,1994: 37, 38} Two other
assumptions, according to Jones, seem necessary in most situations. One is that the search
for alternatives should be exhaustive. However, this is irrational because such a search
would presumably cost more in terms oftime and money than the benefits it would yield.
A final common assumption is that complex decisions. may be broken down into parts
without dan1aging the basic model. In effect, this means maximizing the solutions to the
part is the same as maximizing the whole. However, this is not necessarily the case. The
relationship between the means of achieving an objective and the desired end are not
always that simple in the real world. This is because there is not always certainty - the
assurance that every means will lead to a specific outcome. There is risk and uncertainty.
Risk is the situation where each strategy leads to one of the number of ends each with a
known possibility. Uncertainty is the case where outcomes are known but the
probabilities associated with them are not These metors contribute to the complexity of
the means end relationship and maximizing as well.
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! James G. March, in Rational Choice. says that, "Rational. choice involved two kinds of
. : guesses: guesses about future consequences of current actions and guesses about future
preferences for those consequences. We try to imagine what will happen in the future as a
result of our actionS and we try to imagine how we shall evaluate what will happen.!'-
,.(Elster, 1986: 144). "The idea of rationality," Parsons writes, "has been central to the
~
practice of decision making in the post war era. Models ofdecision making which focus
on rationality argue that if we wish to understand the real world of decision, we must
consider the extent to which a decision has been the outcome of rational processes."
(parsons, 1995:273.)·
Green and Shapiro in, Pathologies orEational Choice Themy. in their discussion of the
generally accepted assumptions about the nature of rational choice theory state that,
''Rational behaviour is typically identified with, 'maximisation ofsome sort' They assert
that " ...iational choice involves utility maximization. To say that a person maximises
utility is to say that when confronted with an array of options, she picks the one she
believes best serves her objectives." They go on to say this, "Rational Choice theorists .
agree, second, that certain consistency requirements must be part of the definition of
rationality. These requirements are seen as essential to the science of social action...."
(Green and Shapiro, 1994: 14, 15). Another assumption that is made is that, " ... each
individual maximizes the expected value of his own payoff measured on some utility
scale." (Luce and Raiffil, 1957: 50). There is a focus on expected rather than actual utility
and this is because decision making often takes place under conditions of uncertainty.
Green and Shapiro further discuss a fourth assumption that is common among rational
choice theorists. This is that, "relative niaximising agents are individuals." (Green and
Shapiro, 1994: 14, 15). The:final assumption that is made is that, "....their models apply
equally to all persons under study - that decisions, rules and tastes are "stable over time
and similar among people." (Stigler and Becker 1977: 76). However, as Goetze and
Galderisi note, "Ifutility functions and perceptions differ widely, and ifpeople havevery
differentcombinatioIlS of altruistic and self interested motives, then the construction of
adequately explanatory models might be frustrated. Patterns of universal behaviour may
not [in that case] be discoverable:' (Goetze and Galderisi, 1983: 38). This isbecause
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people have different perception, motives and goals and there are always different
contexts within which people operate. There is no guarantee of uniformity or
predictability.
" In sum," Green and Shapiro conclude, "rational choice theorists generally agree on an
instrumental conception of individual rationality, by reference to which people' are
thought to maximise their expected utilities in formally predictable ways. In empirical
applications, the further assumption is generally shared that rationality is homogenous
across the individuals under study." (Green and Shapiro, 1994: 17).
In Chapter Three of Rational Choice. entitled 'Advances in Understanding Rational
Behaviour,' John C. Harsanyi writes that, "In everyday life, when we speak of rational
behaviour, in most cases, we are thinking of behaviour involving a choice of the best
means available for achieving a given end. This implies that already, at a common sense
level, rationality is a normative concept: it points to what we should do in order to attain a
given end or objective. But even at a common sense level, this concept ofrationality does
have important positive (non- normative) applications: it is used for explanation, for
prediction and even for mere description of human behaviour. Indeed, the assumption
that a given person has acted' or will act rationally,' often has very considerable
, explanatory and predictive power because it may imply that we can explain or predict a
large number of possibly very complicated facts about his behaviour in terms ofa small
. .
number ofrather simple hypotheses about his goals or objectives." (Elster, 1986: 83).
,..--.
"As we have seen, cost benefit analysis is a key technique of the rational model. " The ,
problem with the cost benefit analysis model is the same as J.S. Mills had identified in
Utilitarianism: not all 'pains and pleasures are equal. Putting a price on various
components of a scheme is not as straight forward as the model suggests...Cost benefit
analysis has its problems and limitations, the first ofwhich is that assumptions and values
ofwel:fiue economics may not be applied to some policy decisions: the prices and costs
and utility of 'good health' or 'noise' or 'deaths' may be considered to be matters which
ar~/bot of the kind which may be easily calculated and measured." (parsons, 1995: 400-
4
402). Cost benefit analysis, economic analysis and social indicators are all ridden with
problems associated with value judgments.
lames G. March, in Chapter Six of"Rational Choice" writes, "Atfirstblushpure"models' .
of rational choice seem obviously appropriate as guides to intelligent action, but more
problematic for predicting behaviour....So long as we use individual choice models to
predict the behaviour of relatively large numbers of individuals or organisations, some
potential problems are avoided by the fumiliar advantages of aggregation...On the other
hand , ifwe choose to predict small numbers of individuals or organisations, the saving
- -~~ - .,~
graces of aggregation are mostly lost." He con~ues, "Rational choice involves two
I' .
/kinds of guesses....we try to imagine what will happen in the future as a result of our
i
I actions and we try to imagine how we shall evaluate what will happen. Neither guess is
necessarily easy. Anticipating future consequences pfpresent decisions is often subject to
substantial error:_Anti9iR~tin8-futyre'p'!eferenceis always confusing." (£lster, 1996: 143- .
. . 144)(R~tional choice theories are concern~dwith thes;g~~ssesand the way in whi~h ;e
~..........."d~with their complications. Tb"ose that focus on choice under uncertainty emphasise
the difficulties ofdetermining the consequences ofactions taken now. Theories ofchoice
under conflict and.ambiguity focus on the difficulties ofguessing what will be desired in
the future. Some of our ideas about choice behaviour have changed due to idea of
bounded rationality.
Bounded" rationality is a concept that was developed by Herbert Simon to explain a
rationality which is limited but is not 'irrational.' In Chapter Five of "Administrative
Behayiour," Herbert Simon clearly lays out a formulation of his position that human
rationality is limited or bounded: "It is impossible for the behaviour of a single isolated
individual to reach any high degree of rationality. The number of alternatives he must
\explore is so great. The information he would need to evaluate them so vast that even an
approximation to objective reality is hard to conceive. Individual choice takes place in a
~ series of 'givens' - premises that are exp~cted by the subject as bases for his choice· and. .' ,
behaviour is adaptive only within the limits set by these 'givens.'" (Simon, 1957: 79)..






organisational environment which frames the processes ofchoice and that human beings
are limited by their psychological environment.
ParsonS, in Public Policy, An Introduction to the themy-and-practice of policy analysis,--
says of rational techniques, "...it is important to note that there are no 'facts' out there.
Data is not neutral, but it is the result ofan exercise ofvalues, beliefs and assumptions. In
studying any decision making episode, it is well to remember that the first questions to
ask are those that focus on the issues of how, why, when and for whom the data was
collected. Rational techniques are only as good as the data which is used." (parsons,
1995: 399).
As we have seen, rational choice involves two guesses - ~ ~ess _~bo_ut uncertain_ futur~ \\
consequences and a guess about uncertain future preference. Human rationality is limited
by the incomplete and fragmented nature of knowledge. "What unites both areas of
analysis in and of the policy process is the way in which both have stressed the role of
infonnation and knowledge. As a subject, policy analysis has for the most part been
shaped by a neo-pluraliStic view of the decision making process. Within this model, the .
role of iIif'ormation is ceritral. Theorists of the policy process focus on the mediation and
filtering of ideas and information whilst those in policy analysis for the policy process
itself focus on the relationship between information, knowledge and 'better decision
. making.'" (parsons, 1995: 428). Parsons goes on to write that, "The use ofmodels and
techniques to improve decision making has had mixed fortunes. The inherent me~siness
of politics militates against the naive belief that decision- making can somehow be made
more 'rational.' There are severe limitations on the use ofanalytical work in real decision
making." (parsons, 1995: 433).
"The model of policy making," Deborah Stone argues in Policy Paradox: The Art of
Political Decision Making, "is a production model where policy is created in a fairly
orderly sequence of stages, almost as if in an assembly line...The production model fails
to capture...the essence of policy making in political communities: the struggle over
ideas." (Stone, 1997:·10,11). According to Parsons, it also ignor~ the idea that there may ..
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be the "...use of analysis to reinforce and legitimate decisions which have already been
made rather than to enable decision makers to choose 'rationally' between options. In
other words, decision makers make a choice and then find a plausible analytical story
. which wiU backit up." (parsons, 1995:433),-Anotherlimitation ofntional·analysis that
has been identified by several analysts is that, "...analysis may be strong on the diagnosis
of problems and fonnulation of policy but weak in tenns of how a policy should be
implemented." (parsons, 1995: 433).
In the second edition of Administrative Behaviour, Simon argues that in order to clarify
. what he means by rationality -in organizational decision making, we have to use two
models: "economic man and administrative man." (parsons, 1995: 278). Simon writes,
"While economic qum maximises - selects the best alternative from all those available to
him; his cousin whom we shall call administrative man, satisfices - looks for the course
of action that is satisfactory or 'good enough.' Examples of satisficing criteria that are·
familiar enough to businessmen, if unfamiliar to most economists are 'share of market,'
'adequate profit,' 'fair price.' Economic man deals with the 'real world,' in all its
complexity. Administrative man recognises that the world he perceives is a drastically
simplified model of..the real world. He is content with this gross simplification because
he believes that the real world is mostly empty - that most of the facts of the real world
have no realrelevance to any particular situation he is facing.. ." (Simon, 1957: xxv). This
means that in making decisions, he takes into account only a few of the factors that he
considers crucial and relevant He simplifies the complex reality so· as to make· the
process easier and more practical.
Parsons writes therefore; "Thus, Simon characterizes decision making by 'administrative
man' as operating in a world ofbounded rationality and as motivated by satisficing rather
than maximising: this means that he makes decisions which are not derived from an
examination of all the alternatives. And furthermore, because he sees the world as
'empty' and ignores the inter relatedness of things - complexity - he can make decisions
.which do not exceed his limited cognitive capacities." (parsons, 1995: 278, 279).
According to Simon, this is a more accurate and realisitic picture of reality. We do,
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indeed have to recognise the limitations that are mced by individuals'and .organisations
when it comes to rationality. It is difficult or impossible to consider all the options and all
the information when making a decision and this is due to limited cognition and
constraints oftime and money; There is·also the distinct possibility that theremay'be-bias -.
in the attitudes of individuals and this means that not only is there an organisational
context, but there is a psychological one as well. This is the framework, or background in
which decisions are taken.
A possible limitation of rational analysis is exemplified when people have different
perceptions of the same problem and when they have motives that may appear to be
conflicting. This can be seen, for example when formulating policies regarding
mvIAIDS: policies that will determine the response oforganisations, thus affecting their
employees. Decisions relating to benefits, training, hiring practice and so on may affect
companies which may find themselves tom between humanitarian aspects and business,
profit making considerations. Employers may often be caught between their obligation to
be or at least to appear to be committed to social issues that affect the larger community
and the requirements of the job which ultimately may be profit making. Perhaps the
rational model can be understood as the attempt to strike thisbalarice.
Differing perspectives and perceptions may also pose difficulty in the approach ·to
problem solving. Individuals may perceive various issues as being key and warranting
immediate attention whereas others may perceive of the same issue· as probably
warranting attention, not at the present moment but in the future. Human perception may
be clouded by numerous mctors, some of which may be purely personal, for example
when they are influenced by deep seated opinions, values, or when individuals have a
personal stake in the eventual outcomes of the decisions that they make. Parsons writes,
"Is it' really possible for decision makers to make a calculation with regard to the
outcomes of policies? In the real world of decision making, actors do not confront
organisations devoid of values, prejudices, history, culture and experiences." (parsons,
1995:279).
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Kingdon, in Agendas. Alternatives and Public Policies, writes, "The values one brings to
an observation play a substantial role in problem definition. A mismatch between the
observed conditions and one's conception of an ideal state becomes a problem."
(Kingdon, 1995-: 'I 10). Thus,·perceptionis important, as well·as ptoblem'definition.An· ..
individual, who is in a position to influence policy relating to health, pollution, transport
and so on, may be affected by his personal experiences. Kingdon writes, "Sometimes,
subjects become prominent agenda items partly because important policy makers have
personal experiences that bring the subject to their attention." This is an important factor
in understanding problem definition - the psychological context that may cloud rational
decision- making.
Predicting future consequences is another problem ofrationality that we have discussed.
This problem is related to the fact that available knowledge is limited or fragmented and
that oftenit is necessary to rely on val'uations and projected estimates because future
estimates cannot really be known. An example is that it is perhaps more difficult to
estimate the number ofpeople that may be affected by an epidemic or a particular health
.crisis because unlike in some other policy area, health disasters often occur gradually and
often over a prolonged period of time. Perhaps also, there is the question of visibility
where the people are affected patient by patient rather than simultaneously in large
numbers. Kingdon writes, "The basic unit in health is the patient provider exchange.
When something goes wrong, it does not show up in a major crisis. If there is to be a
crisis scale impact, it must occur in a series of minute changes, patient by patient and
eventually build to a problem of major proportions, or the individual cases must be
aggregated into a study or statistic .that proves to be compelling." (Kingdon, 1995: 95,
96).
We see therefore that this is an area where rational analysis may be difficult to carry out
due to insufficient infonnation. Prediction may not be as accurate as desired. This is the
case where we find different 'experts' coming up with a wide range ofpredictions and
estimates; statistics that sometimes further confuse issues rather than illuminate them.
Herbert Simon believes that some arrangements are 'better' than others for attaining a
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more rational decisIon ~aking process. "When an issue becomes highly controversial·-
when it is surrounded by uncertainty and conflicting values - then expertise is very hard
to come by, and it is no longer easy to legitimate the experts. In these circumstances, we
. find that there-are experts for-the affirmative and experts for the·negative. We carirtot
settle such issues by turning them over to particular groups of experts. At best, we may
convert the controversy into an adversary proceeding in which we, the laymen, listen to
the experts but have to judge between them." (Simon, 1983: 197). This ties in to the issue
of information which is an important prerequisite ifrational analysis is to be done.
The notion ofrationality being limited by an individual's psychological, political, social .
environment is key to the understanding ofdecision making. It is important to ask where
information comes from and what processes of legitimating information sources are in
place to. ensure credibility. Hein Marais, in AIDS Review 2000, says for example, of the
South African government's response to IllV/AIDS, " The decisions, actions and
omissions that shaped the....response...were also influenced by a mix of other factors,
among them political concerns,.the inevitable imprints of the society's history ofracism
(and on going racism) and the personal sensitivities of high ranking politicians. An
inquiry....has to also venture into the thicket of intersections between the political, social
and personal domains."(Marais, 2000: 44). Therefore, opinions or policies that may
appear to be inconsistent and incompatible with eXisting, accepted and established filcts
may have.1O be analysed bearing the mentioned factors in mind. .
As we have already mentioned, in some cases decision- makers seek out information or
use analysis as a tool to reinforce decisions already made, rather than as a guide for
choosirig rationally between alternative courses of action. Thus, it is worth bearing in
nund that rational techniques are reliant on sufficient, accurate and unbiased data and this
is problematic considering that human beings operate within an environment where there
is so much conflicting information which clouds or biases perceptions. Simon, in his
discussion of administrative man, paints quite a useful picture of the way that he
'satisfices' and takes account ofonly the facts he considers relevant to him at the moment
in a necessary simplification of reality, thus preventing or minimising conflict during
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analysis. This would seem useful in decision making and appears to be a more realistic
approach to both the analysis and understanding ofdecision making.
As we have seen~above; individual perception and- understanding·has an influeooe on
problem definition. In addition, there may be more than one motive and this may create a
conflict as it frames decision- making. An example is with environmental policy - there
may be a conflict between economic development and pollution. Where industries are
taxed for the pollution emitted into the environment, or where they have to dispose of .
their waste safely but expensively, policy makers may have to perfonn a difficult
juggling act to strike a balance between industrial or business interests and the concerns
ofenvironmentalists. We can take this illustration a step further as it emerges that there is
often a clash between different policy areas which at the end ofthe day may have similar
motives or goals. Because it is difficult or impossible to please everyone, policy making
may draw from the rational model but perhaps may have to bear other considerations in
mind and perhaps compromise will· be necessary. As we have seen, there is always. .
politics at play in the policy cycle and individuals, as well as orgariizations often have to
consider the opinions of interest groups, environmental lobbyists, AIDS activists and so
on. Different pressures come to bear on the policy process.
Taking all these metors into consideration, it is clear that the polic~ process is complex
and numerous mctors come into play. The rational model which has been described as an
<individual choice model,' may be advantageous in cases where there is no attempt to
find a uniform explanation through aggregation. Prediction becomes a problem where
various individuals and organisations behave in ways that seem inconsistent and'
unrelated. This meatJ.s that whereas the rational model may be a useful guide for action,
other metors that influence the policy process may make prediction and generalization
difficult as each case is unique.
The different problems and difficulties encountered in an attempt to make decision
making rational have led to certain changes in the model that allow for other influences.
As we have discussed, Simon's model of bounded rationality is one such model and it
11
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seems to paint a more realistic picture of the policy process: In this regard, therefore, it
enables a greater understanding. In the face ofoverwhelming information, options, causes
and consequences, individuals make their choices based on simplified versions ofreality.
This seems plausible when we compare it with our own patterns ofdecision and action en
a daily basis. It simplifies by leaving out what is defined as irrelevant and includes only
what is considered crucial and relevant - and this may vary from case to case. A universal
explanation may be difficult to provide. It is important then, if we are to understand the
. policy process, to consider the particular context and to try and uncover the hidden
dynamics that may be at work and are likely to influence the process. Although it seems
that pure rationality is a very ambitious model that may be somewhat impossible to
achieve, it is no doubt useful in understanding various aspects ofthe policy process. This
is especially so when we consider its limitations and the met that 'bounded' rationality is
a more realistic model if we are to enlighten ourselves about various issues and
processes.
"To understand actions and responses, we need to look at the group ofaetions involved,
the agencies within which they operate and the facfurs which influence their behaviour.
We need to consider aetors and agencies not just in single roles as the makers of policy
for others to implement or the implementers of someone else's policy ...but in a
combination ofroles including a third, that ofinterested parties affected.by the outcomes
of policy made and implemented by themselves or others." (Barrett and Fudge, 1981:
26).
The top down rational system of implementation was the first model on the scene and
brought to an end the neglect of the politics of implementation. The original study by
Pressman and Wildavsky set out and essentially 'top - down' view of implementation.
.Effective implementation, they argued, required a good chain ofcommand and a capacity
to .coordinate and control. Pressman and Wildavsky describe implementation as, "a
process of interaction. between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieve
l .
them...The rational model is imbued with ideas that implementation is about getting
-- p"eople to do what th,ey are told and keeping control over a sequence ofstages in a system
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and about the development of a programme of control which minimises conflict and I
deviation from the initial 'policy hypothesis.' (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973:xiii, XV).
They further argue that " ...implementation will become less and less effective as the links
between all '. the various agencies" involved in carrying out· 'a ~policy form· an
'implementation deficit.' Goals have to be clearly defined and understood, resources
made available, the chain of command be capable of assembling and controlling
resources and the system able to communicate effectively and control those organisations
or individuals involved in the performance of tasks." (parsons, 1995: 464).
A limitation of rational analysis that has been identified by several analysts is that it is
strong on the diagnosis of problems but weak in terms of how a policy should be
implemented. Perhaps this is due to the fuct that as Lindblom and Cohen, in Usable
Knowledge, have argued, "Information and analysis provide only one route among
several to social problem solving because...problem solving is and ought to be
accomplished through various forms of social interaction that substitute action for
thought, understanding or analysis....ordinary knowledge and causal analysis are often
sufficient or better for social problem solving." (Lindblom and Cohen, 1979: 10). "Policy
analysis since the 1950's has however, as Parsons writes, "...been dominated by the
rational 'information' model. Our age has been one which has seen quite a phenomenal
increase in information and in our capacity to store and process this information. Policy
analysis with its variety 'of 'qualitative' and 'quantitative' approaches has been one
response to the knowledge revolution. The use of computers has also been seen as a
powerful technological answer to the quest for more rational decision making."(parsons
1995: 428). This idea has been the inspiration behind the development ofpolicy analysis
in the post war era.
We must note however that in the final analysis, it is policy makers who must carry out
the finer details of policy analysis and implementation. Computers cannot solve the
problems ofineffective mailagement and government There are many factors which have
to work in conjunction with technological advancements. "Among these factors must be
. ,




decision making and the behaviour ofpoliticians, bureaucrats and professionals involved
in a policy or programme." (Reinennann, 1987: 186). Implementation is more likely to
be successful when a programme enjoys a high degree of political support. One of the
.most commonly voiced criticisms- of the South African 'government's AIDS programme ..
is that it was not buttressed by sufficient political commitment Hein Marais writes in
AIDS Review 2000. To The Edge, "Assuming that sufficient political commitment
indeed was lacking (at least until 1998), one can ask whether adequate commitment
would have translated into an effective AIDS programme. The query resists a definitive
answer. It has been argued that....political will was not the single factor shaping the
efficacy ofthe...response. Indeed, excessive emphasis on political commitment leads one
to the idea that anything becomes possible as long as it is impelled by sufficient will. A
more troubling question should be posed: Would a constant stream of pronouncements
and exhortations. have pierced the shroud of invisibility surrounding IllV and AIDS?
Perhaps the answer is revealed by posing an inverse but rhetorical question: Has the
disease been combated anywhere effectively without steadfast and persistently expressed
political commitment? The response has to be 'no. ' Political commitment seems to be an
essential, but in itself insufficient factor in an effective bid to manage the disease."
(Marais, 2000: 27,28).
Schneider and Stein, in Implementing AIDS poliqy in post apartheid South Africa, argue
that, "Lack of political will or commitment is a common reason given, by both internal
actors and external observers for the difficulty of implementing AIDS policy in South
Africa. Political commitment is taken to mean a number of things including personal
identification with AIDS cause by influential politicians... and willingness on their part to
mobilise adequate resources and to'fust track' implementation." (Schneider and Stein,
2000: ~). It does not mean, however, that political commitment will remove
im:plementation difficulties experienced by the government. There is an assumption that
for major policy change to occur there has to be action taken by political leaders. This
takes it for granted that there are resources such as capital and that there is institutional
capacity as well as stability. This is a rational model whichis not always easy to find in
reality.
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The rational model is to a certain extent useful for understanding the policy process. It
.does have its merits but there are certainly various factors that could be considered in an
attempt to .improve· the rationality -of the process as a whole. -It is· important to -base- -_...
decisions not on a single case, but on numerous ones. This is useful as it reduces the
chances of bias and inaccuracy and improves the chances that prediction will be more
accurate and reliable, based on averages. It is also worth making sure that decisions are
thought through before implementing them because each case, while possibly modelled
on another, is unique. It is also important to ensure that in a group context, individuals
feel free to express opinions that run counter to accepted wisdom. Evidence that may be
'controversial' or unconventional, and may challenge existing data may also be worth
looking into. As we have seen, it is also important to have experts especially when
carrying out cost benefit analysis and impact assessment tests. It is crucial to have a grasp
ofelementary statisticS.
With all these factors in mind, the question arises ofwhether or not the rational model as
we know it aids in understanding the policy process. We have mentioned already ways in
which this model can give an insight into the policy process·especially so the model of
bounded rationality. Therefore, it seems that the rational model must be studied or
applied within a certain context, based on each unique case. It is important to realize that
rationality is indeed bounded by difference in perceptions and problem definition,
differences in opinion regarding what is and is not relevant, difference in priority,
conflicting interests, and other factors that interact and impact on the process.
As we have seen, another important :factor is capacity - institutional, political - in the
policy process. This seems to be an assumption of the model. In the concluding remarks
of, Pathologies of Rational Choice TheOlY, by Green and Shapiro, we read, "If social
science were viewedless as a prizefight between competing theoretical perspectives, only
one ofwhich may prevail, and more of a joint venture in which explanations condition
. .
and augment one another, the partisan impulses that give rise to methodologically
deficient research may be held in check. The question will change from 'Whether or not
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rational theory?' to something more fruitful: 'How does rationality interact with other
meets of human nature and organization to produce the politics that we seek to
understand?'" (Green and Shapiro, 1994: 204). This is indeed an important question. It
seems clear that :thereare numerousmctors that should be taken into consideration-when
analysing the processes of policy making and implementation. Human beings are
dynamic social and political creatures and there is an organizational context too that may
impact on these processes in their attempt to achieve rationality. Perhaps the rational
model is more useful when it is seen as an ideal upon which other factors come into play,
thus modifying it Green and Shapiro. in their response to one of the counter arguments
that may be advanced in response to their critique ofthe rational choice theory, write that,
''In practice, few rational choice theorists who tangle with empirical questions in a
serious way are pure universalists."(Green and Shapiro, 1994: 192). There is instead, a
commitment to other types of rationality - segmented universalism, partial universalism
or the fiunily-of-theories view.· Proponents of segmented universalism contend that
rational choice theory is only successful in certain areas of politics. Partial universalists
. are of the opinion that rational choice explains some and not all behaviour in all
situations. Thus, they leave open just how much is explained by the maximisation of
interests. Those who defend the fiunily-of-theories, as the name suggests, feel that there is
not one rational choice theory and that different ones generate quite different predictions.
This is because each model relies on competing assumptions.
/
/ The point that rationality interacts with other factors is important and it does seem to
create a better understanding of the policy process. An example is at the implementation
stage. We have already noted that the rational top down approach of implementation
assumes a number of mctors about the context In his book, Limits to Administration,
Chrisloyher HooH1976) set. ()!'!f!"".conditions for perfect m:plemenlationoo"e is that 11
IdealunplementatlOn I~J!_'p'rodu£'L~urntary 'army' like organIZatIon, With clear lines of \1
.... - - . .' ------------- .•. _.~ -'---
authority. Thus, there is a clear hierarchy with a clear and a good chain of command.
Secondly, that norms would be enforced and objectives given. People should know what
they are doing and what they are required to achieve. Their activities should also conform
to certain standards and_expectations. The third condition is that people wo~ld do what
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they are told and asked. This means that people will follow orders and there will be no
dissent This is to ensure objectives are met and that things run smoothly. Fourthly, that
there should be perfect communication in and between units of organization. This is
. related,to the-clear lines of-command'and the clear understanding ofobjeetives; People
should know exactly what is expected ofthem and they should understand what it is that
are supposed to achieve. This is only possible where there is effective communication.
The final condition is that there would be no pressure of time. This means that there is
sufficient time available to do what is to be done. This will ensure there is effective and
systematic implementation of policy. Thus, according to this model of implementation,
"where implementation has fuiled - that is, a policy objective has not been met - it may be
saidto be due to mctors such as the selection of the wrong 'machinery' or 'instruments;'
the programming of the bureaucracy was incorrect; operationalization was poor;
something went wrong at the 'shop floor level' or there was a poor response to
problems." (Dunshire 1990: 15).
However, policy makers should realize that policy'is best implemented by what Elmore
(1985) termed as backward mapping of problems and policy which involves defining
, '
success in human or behavioural terms rather than as a completion of a 'hypothesis.'
, ("Forward mapping - or the top down approach is difficult to maintain and may not be'"'\
effective where the context is not right It does not take a sufficient or realistic account of ;,
! the role of actors in the process of implementation. Human beings are not SimP~11
! machines in a line of command and they often bring to the policy process their own
; interpretations and perception. Thus, the relationship between policy makers and
1_'
~- . /
deliverers is more complex than this approach suggests. '
Therefore, implementation takes place, or is carried out within a certain context and
conditions may not necessarily be as perfect and ideal as stipulated in the rational model.
Thus, implementation difficulties in particular instances may not be fully understood
using this framework, for example where the institutional context does not facilitate
action or encourage problem solving. Here, we may possibly return to the example' of
priorities, or indeed capacity. There is a need for functional organisations and
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management systems as well as an enabling social, political and economic context with
skilled and committed personnel. In the absence ofthis type of enabling environment, it
becomes difficult to adapt the rational model in formulating effective policy as well as
implementing it However;·perhaps·it---could aid in the understanding ofnational policy .
when the context is taken into consideration and reality is compared with what would be
ideal: that is, ifrationality is used as a frame ofreference, a kind ofpoint ofdeparture.
Perhaps it is true to say that perfect rationality may be an ideal that is impossible to put
._into practice. There needs to be creativity and a mixture ofvarious strategies depending
on the context. Even if perfect rationality may be unachievable, perhaps ifa committed
effo.rt were made to really understand the problem and explore alternatives the policy
process would be a more efficient one.
Whatever the case, perfect rationality seems to be an ideal that could be useful in the
policy process if taken as such and ifthere is a realisation that human actors interact with
rationality to create what we observe in politics.
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PART TWO
2.0 STUDY FlNDINGS AND DISCUSSION
This study was carried out in the province of Kwazulu- Natal. A semi- structured
questionnaire was administered face to face to respondents from fifteen companies. The
questionnaire dealt with HIV/AIDS policy. Respondents were asked about their
understanding of the issues surrounding mv/AIDS and what they were doing about
them- their policies, programmes and interventions.
Purposive sampling was used because it was feasible. The companies that participated in
this study were purposefully chosen to reflect enterprises that differ both in scale of
employment and type ofactivity. Where there was unwillingness by a certain company to
participate, it was easy to choose another one as long as there was some variation in the
sample.
According to the Department of Trade and Industry's White Paper on National Strategy
for the Development and Promotion of Small Businesses in South Africa, 1995, small
. enterprises constitute the bulk ofestablished business with employment ranging from 5 to
about 50~ These businesses are likely to operate from business or industrial premises, be
.tax registered and meet other formal registration requirements. The classification in tenns
ofassets and turnover is difficult, given the wide differences in various business sectors
like retailing, manufacturing, professional services and construction. Medium enterprises
constitute a category difficult to demarcate vis-a-vis the 'small' and 'big' categories. The-
employment of200.and capital assets (excluding property) ofaboutR 5 million are often
seen as the upper limit Table 1 below is ordered in terms ofscale ofemployment
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Table 1; CompanY Actiyities. Number ofEmployees and Average Age
COMPANY TYPE OF TOTAL OF TOTAL OF TOTAL OF AVERAGE
ACTIVITY EMPLOYEES MALES FEMALES AGES_.
A Shipping 1542 1141 (74%) 401 (26%) 35-40
Company
E Aluminium 1400 1384 (98.9%) 16 (1.1 %) 36
Plant
-.
J WsJr:r 1200 850 (70.8%) 350 (29.2%) 45
Management
D Newspaper 983-1080 735 (74.8%) 248 (25.2%) 32-36
Company
K Wax and Oil 500 125 (25%) 375 (75%) 25·30
Byproducts
B Manufacture 477 459 (96.2%) 18 (3.8%) 36
Brake Pads
H Chemical Plant 300-320 287 (95.7%) 13 (4.3%) . 30-35
·G Packaging 309 299(%.8%) 10 (3.2%) 30
Plant
F Manufacture 212 202 (95.3%) 10 (4.7%) 28-32
Chip Board
N Supermarket 145-205 93(64.1%) 52 (35.9010) 30-35
I Retailers 70-150 23 (32.9010) 47 (67.1%) 32
L Manufacture 90 77 (85.6%) 13 (14.4%) 46
Animal Feed
M Maize Mill 78 67 (85.9%) 11 (14.1%) 35-40
0 Retailers 48 25 (52.1%) 23 (47.9010) 32
C Social Issues 24 13 (54.2%) 11 (45.8%) 40
Note: Where there are two values for number of employees, thIS represents occasional
casual labourers.
The table shows that eight companies employ over 300, four of which have over 1000
employees and can be considered to be large enterprises. 'Three companies employ
between 100 and 212 people and can be described as middle size companies. The
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remaining four companies are small enterprises employing between 24 and 90 people
each.
Kinds of activities and age vary as well. Different business sectors are represented and 0
these include food manufacturing and retailing to chemical and metal processing. Other
enterprises range from the packaging and water management to the shipping industry.
The gender composition of the workforce is influenced by the company's activity. The
shipping company and the processing plants overwhelmingly employ males whereas
retailers had a higher proportion of females. "In the developing world, slightly more
women than men are infected." (Quattek, 1999: 2). The average ages of the employees,
ranged from 25-46 years of age. This is an interesting demogmphic as "the disease is
foun.d mainly in two specific age groups, infants and adults between 20 and 40 years of
age." (Quattek, 1999: 2).
2.1 Company Policy on HIVIAlDS
The Key Informants were initially intended to include ChiefExecutive Officers and
Senior Management The basis ofthe selection was that the Key Informant was required
to have a knowledge and grasp ofcompany policy regarding IDVIAIDS as well as
matters relating to resource allocation. However, these individuals invariably referred the
o 0
matter to the Human Resources Manager. There was only a basic knowledge by senior
management ofWhat IDVIAIDS policy and/or Practice entailed. For the 'companies that
had clinics on site, the nurse was mentioned as a person who was intimately involved
with the company's illV/AIDS strategy. However, for a wider view ofthe issues, it was
important to spe8.k to someone in management who may be in a better position to answer
questions relating to policies including hiring, training and benefits. Thus, the Key
Infonnants were usually the Human Resources Managers ofthe companies. In addition, a
few other opinions were sought from some clinic staff
The respondents recognized that illVIAIDS was a problem. There was also the feeling
from the Key Informants that IDV/AIDS had had an impact on their companies. The
impact had been felt differently in the various companies when,ofor example there had
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been mY/AIDS related deaths. There was also a financial impact reported by some ofthe
respondents. This came from training people who passed away due to the illness. Also,
from having to retrain people to replace them without the guarantee that the same thing
would not happen;·'
In light of the impact of HIV/AIDS on companies, the respondents were asked if the
companies that they represented had any policy on IllV/AIDS. Ofthe fifteen respondents
only four stated that the companies they represented had any such policy. One additional.
company had a draft policy. KI-F reported that the policy had been in existence for about
two months. KI-H said that the company he represented had formulated a policy just over
a year ago. KI-L's company had had a policy for two years and the company which had
had a policy in effect for the longest time- nine years - was represented by KI-J. The
respondents ~ere asked about whom helped them to develop their policies. Key
Informants D and F reported that their policies had come down from their head offices.
The latter said that it had come from the Group Risk Manager. Key Informants J and L
mentioned that they had had assistance from people from the medical profession. Medical
"consultants and Occupational Health Nurses"had been involved. KI-H said that the policy
was developed within the company and ideas were borrowed from what other companies
were doing. Some organisations that were mentioned that were also consulted were
ACTS (AssoCiation of Catholic Tertiary Students) and ATICC (AIDS Training
Information and Counselling.Centre).
2.1.1 How Extensive is the Policy?
All the policies but one- from company J- were not very extensive. They were rather brief
and basic covering issues that were discussed in general guidelines for employment
practice. They basically assured. that an IllV positive empl~yee will be treated as any
other and that pre employment testing will not be required. All employees would have
access to agreed company benefits. There would also be a confidentiality guarantee
regarding the IDV status ofemployees.
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One of the documents seemed vague when it came to the question of pre employment
testing. It stated that, "Discrimination against persons applying for advertised positions
on the basis of mv status is illegal. Pre employment medical examinations will take
place to ensure that the person is fit for the job in question." It is simply one statement
followed by another and there does not seem to be a clear stand on the issue. The policies
also· did not specifY important measures such as ongoing education and reeducation
campaigns. Also, there is no mention of the resources that will be allocated towards
realising the policies. Moreover, they make no mention, for example of recognition of
and sensitivity to the employees' different religious, political and cultural beliefs. These
are ,important aspects because they may influence perception and understanding of
HrV/AIDS and related issues.
2.1.2 The Companies without Policy specific to HIV/AIDS
The other eleven informants reported that their companies did not have policies specific
to IDV/AIDS. A common response was that the policies they had were wide reaching and
not specific. There were a few general sweeping remarks made about the importance of
policy even among those who did not have any, thus,
"Policies are important. .. implementation is important. .. there will be future
consequences." (KI-A)
Despite this statement, little was being done by way of trying to develop a policy or
putting any· meaningful interventions in place. The Key Informant (A) who made this
statement is an individual who worked in a shipping company and had stated that the
disease is going to escalate especially because ofthe nature ofthe work - people were at
sea for months on end. He stated too that testing was compulsory according to the law for
'transport people.' When he was asked about what he would expect ifemployees became
too sick to work, he replied,
"We would help them... We can only aim for those that are negative and care for
those that are positive." (KI-A)
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This is a rather vague response and it characterised many of the responses of the key
informants so much so that it seemed is though there was a lot oftokenism and no clear
explanation ofwbat plan there' was for a'meaningful response toHIv/AIDS. The fact that"
this key informant stated that policy and implementation were important did not translate'
into a practical approach to the problem, even ifhe thought that his company would be
particularly affected by the epidemic.
Others said that there were general guidelines and that AIDS was treated like any other
major illness. Some used the Code of Good Practice or the Employment Equity Act as
guidelines. KI-Kreported that the company that he worked for used the Code of Good
Practice.. This came from an initiative at an October 1995 Durban conference organized
by AIDS Legal Network. This document was intended to be a guideline~d a quote from
it reads, "Employers, employees and organisations are encouraged to develop and refine
the principles in the code into detailed IDV/AIDS policies and programmes that are
suited to the character of each particular workplace." This had clearly not been done by
the company that KI-K represented. Another respondent reported that all practice was
consistent with what was laid down in the Employment Equity Act
The definition of HIV/AIDS as any other disease was evident Many of the respondents
reported that although there was no policy specific to dealing with this particular disease,
it fell under theframework ofgeneral health policy and it was treated as any other major
illness. However,. it is clear that IDV/AIDS is not like any other illness. Besides the filet
that it is a disease to which a lot ofsocial stigma is attached, it is a disease that could and
is having potentially devastating effects not only in small communities but to entire
economies as well. Therefore, it may not be enough to place the response to this disease
(
within general health policy. Although many of the respondents said HIV/AIDS was
treated as any other major. illness, there was some inconsistency as. some stated that
HIV/AIDS should be treated differently. An informant, who represented a company that
had no policy, felt that an important issue that had to be addressed was that of equity of
benefits. She felt that it 'was expensive to manage a person from the sick stage, to·
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sheltering them. She felt that it was not mir for people with HIV/AIDS to get the same
benefitS as other employees. She said,
"All the people who are dying are young people who have given a relatively short
service. We need to work out their benefits in a different way because it does not
seem mir that they will be treated the same as people who have been here for a
longer time. There does not seem to be equity ofbenefits. This will also affect
profit margins and affordability in the long run." (KI-B)
There was a common response that was given that summed up the guidelines that were
used. These included a no testing policy, no discrimination in hiring or training,
accessibility to counselling and provision ofeducation. Sick and other benefits were dealt
with as with other major illness. However, these guidelines were often vague and they
often did not address issues of importance. One infonnant felt strongly that there was a
need for policy that the management was ignoring. She felt that there was a need to have
a systematic way to deal with an employee who fell ill and could not continue to work,
"There should be something official to inform us ofhow to deal with financial
needs and provisions, pension... death benefits and whether they would cover
mY/AIDS. Also, how would it be handled ifsomeone needed more time after
they have exhausted their sick leave....ifsomeone's spouse or child was sick... do
you conSider this in the policy as well? What about the question oftaking time off
to attend funerals. Is there a limit?" (KI-C) .
These were some ofthe issues that she felt should be addressed by her company which
did not even have a policy. She also felt that basic information was required and so was
the access to condoms and information leaflets.
The respondents were aware that involuntary mY/AIDS testing was prohibited by the
law. Also, that confidentiality of status was supposed to be, ifdesired by an individual,
guaranteed by the company. The absence ofpolicy not only makes it difficult to aetwhen
confronted with related issues in the workplace. There is clearly a need for policy to
guide and inform action. Besides this, lack ofpolicy increases the chances that there will
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be discrimination and inconsistency when dealing with issues. In the absence ofpolicies
that are specific and suited for the particular company's needs, individuals can make their
own rules and implement them as they see fit. Thus, although all ofthe Key Informants
stated that there was no discrimination on the basis ofmY/AIDS -status, in practice, -this ..
was not always the case. According to National Policy, there are supposed to be no marks
on an employee's medical report that indicate HIV status. However, an informant from a
company with no policy pointed to a possible loophole in the system especially where
there was a company clinic or doctor. She·said,
''Ifa person goes to the company clinic and it is suspected that he/she is infected,
he/she is referred to the company doctor. When the medical report comes back,
even if it does not specify mY/AIDS, we know because ofthe way iUs phfased,
whether the person is HIV positive."(KI-D)
The fact that there was a mechanism in place to find out secretly, whether or not an
employee was mY positive, begs the question of for what purpose this information was
used. This is a company that had little by way of interventions and it was clear that there
were no structures in place to deal with employees who were mY positive.
Other informants felt that the absence of a policy seemed to propagate a certain amount
of complacency. Various reasons were given for this and they were expressed explicitly
as well as with some speculation. One respondent clearly stated that there was
discriminatfon that stemmed from a perception about those a.ffected by the disease. The
deaths were occurring only among unskilled workers. A comment made by one black
respondent was thlis,
''It is mostly black workers who are affected by the disease... they are seen to be
easily replaceable... I think that if it was white people who were infected,
something more would be done." (KI-E)
Some respondents, including KI's G and K, did not have clear responses when they were
asked about what measures they would take ifan employer became too sick to work.
They answered that they dealt with individuals on a case by case basis. In the absence of
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a policy frameworkto infonn decisions ofthis nature, there may be room for subjectivity .
and an inconsistent response.
There is room'to deal with -the·workers ·on a case by case basis which'means that
ifsomeone is known to be a steady and consistent worker and generally has a
good reputation, this is considered before any action is taken. (KI-K)
. This hardly seems like an impartial way to deal with an individual who has become too ill
to work. Thus, it seems that in the absence of policy, there are situations that may arise
that may not be dealt with efficiently and fairly.
2.2 Company Understanding ofHIVIAlDS and the challenges posed to their
organization
Although most ofthose interviewed reported that there was no lllV/AIDS policy in their
companies, key infonnants said that they were 'concerned' or 'very concerned' about
issues related to lllV/AIDS in the workplace. Commonly AIDS was regarded to be an
important issue nationally and by projection, something that would affect companies
although this impact was seen to be largely in the long tenn. The attitudes of the key
infonnants seemed coloured more by their race than their gender. In general terms, black
respondents felt that not enough was being done while white and Indian respondents felt
that the lllV/AIDS problem was a personal health issue and more importantly. a cultural.
one.
2.2.1 The Problem ofmv/AIl>S (Is HIV/AIDS recognised as a problem?)
Despite the fact that most of the Companies in the study did not have policies regarding
HIV/AIDS, the disease was seen as a serious issue. Some companies had already begun
to feel the impact of the disease and had been mad~ more aware of its immediacy by
several recent deaths.
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"The problem is bigger than we think. I am not aware ofthe status ofeach and
every individual on site but there have been quite a number ofdeaths." (KI-F)
''It is a problem but it is hard to paint a realistic picture. We cannot be sure of the
.exact statistics-but we know that since 1994, we have had 29 AIDS related deaths;
(KI -E)
" People ignore it but it is going to have a definite effect... for people at sea
especially, it is going to escalate." (KI - A)
For some, the company's physical location aggravated and contributed to the scale ofthe
problem.
"I believe that we have a higher than average occurrence of AIDS as there waS a
trucking company next door to us. The employees from here and those from next
door frequently. interacted at a social level." (KI-B)
Management denial of the problem is.manifest in several ways. Sometimes it is explicit
Attempts over three years to get the company to develop and implement a policy, in one
instance, has met with consistent management denial about the possible impact of
ffiV/AIDS on the workforce. As she put it,
"There is denial that AIDS could affect the organization. I have been trying for
the last three years to get management to consider fonnulating and effecting an
mY/AIDS policy... but nothing." (KI - C)
At other times, the denial is more concealed as company management tries to place the
problem in a broader occupational health context Thus,
•
"It is difficult for us to tell who is infected because this area was formally marshy
and so the workers are exposed to damp conditions especially when they work the
night shift. We do not know whether some ofthe symptoms we see relate to this
or to IllV/AIDS. The doctor has sent alarm bells ringing to management but we
just do not know." (KI - E)
Ignorance also emerged' in the course of the interviews:
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'It is a problem because the window period is about ten years. We just do not
knowenough. (KI-G)
Ignorance about the disease was also revealed when one informant externalised the issue,
"We should not discriminate because we should know better but that is not
always how it is. This is not a race or a gay issue. Everyone who is promiscuous
is vulnerable. Unfortunately, there is a stigma and we really do need acceptance. I
think that this would go some way in dealing with the problem" (KI-N)
Whereas there is a plea for acceptance and an attempt to move from the stereotype ofthe
infected individual, this informant showed that she was not sufficiently aware ofthe facts
hers~lf IDV/AIDS does not only affect people who are promiscuous and this is an
attitude that projects the disease onto the 'other.' The situation will not be effectively
dealt With ifthis is the attitude.
Many. of the respondents reported th~t they were aware of the impact of the disease
because of the problems of weight loss, absenteeism and death of the employees. KI-H
felt that it was a problem for the company because there was increased absenteeism and
people were falling ill. The workforce was affected. Another respondent felt that the
company would have felt the impact of the illness but for a mistake by the personnel
department He said,
"It would have been a bigger problem than it is at present but because personnel
made a mistake and hired too many people who all signed contracts, the impact of
AIDS related deaths is not being felt." (KI-K)
If the problem is defined in these terms, perhaps there will be a justification for non- .
response. In this case, the company does not feel the impact of the disease because ofa
mistake by the persoD.nel department This begs the question of whether or not the
company has a social responsibility to act even when the impact has not yet been felt
There was awareness in this company· that the employees were affected but the
complacency stemmed from the fact that the labour was still available.
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Most of the respondents reported at least one death a year for the past three years. Key
Informant M.reported five deaths in the last three years from a company with a total of78
employees. KI-E who stated that the company had been 'hit hard' said thatthere had been·
29 AIDS related deaths since 1994. Key Informant K reported five deaths in the year
2000 and said that there was a 30% infection rate. KI-G, from a company employing 309
employees reported two deaths in the past two years. She also stated that six more were
positive and that twenty- eight others were suspected to be the same.
This understanding ofmY/AIDS as simply a problem ofdeaths among employees seems
to be a very limited understanding. IfIllY/AIDS related deaths are not recorded by the
company, then it is possible for mY/AIDS not to be defined as a problem. However, this
is dangerous because the disease may be invisible, depending on the stage of infection.
This means that companies may be feeling a fa1s~ sense of security and they may not be
acting to protect themselves from future consequences. There seemed to be a feeling that
the problem was not immediate, even where there were deaths. Perhaps this is linked to
the question of who was affected most and how valuable they were considered to be by
the company.
There was also some misunderStandmg in this area One ofthe respondents who did not
feel that IllV/AIDS was not an immediate problem for the employees in her company felt
that age profile of employees was seen to act against any negative impact. She reported
that the average age ofthe employees in her company was about 46 years, which she felt
meant~ they were not particularly vulnerable to the disease as she associated it with
younger people. This was despite the fact that most employees worked in the factory in
shifts often working irregular and unsociable. hours. She said, for example, that they
worked from two o'clock in the afternoon to ten o'clock at night, and were unable to .
return home at the end of their day. Ironically, she noted that the fuet that they were .
forced to stay away from home meant that STIs were common among staff This seems to
indicate confusion between mv and AIDS. The filet that STIs were common among the
employees means that they had definitely exposed themselves to a risk of contracting
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mv/AIDS and so they were, contrary to the perceptions ofthe respondent, vulnerable to
the disease.
The question ofwho is infected is-an·important question-because itmay help to clarify
the attitudes of some of the respondents that the disease is not an immediate problem,
even in the mce of multiple deaths. There were reports that management was not always
in tune with the Key Informants. This is a very important aspect as one of the Key
Infonnatits (KI-L) pointed out that the branch manager of the company that she·
represented was a great believer that the employees were the company's greatest asset
and their welmre was ofparamount importance. There was cOncern expressed about his
impending departure. Thus, it is importantto note that even where there is understanding
and recognition of the issues, this does not always filter down to all the employees in the
company.
Key Informant C stated that there was an attitude of 'us' and 'them,' where the fonner
referred to the organisation and the latter the larger community. The company employed
a small number ofpeople and was co~cemed with issues ofsocial action. Thus, there was
the feeling that it was people in the greater community who were affected and not the
employees themselves. This again is anextemalization ofthe problem and it does reveal
ignomnce about the nature ofthe disease.
There was also a feeling by a number of the interviewees that where there was no sense
ofurgency, it was due to the met that the disease was seen as a 'black versus white' issue.
KI-E felt, for example that,
"There have been about 5 deaths each year since 1994 and these have all been
AIDS related. This should be enough to set alarm bells ringing. I think that the
reason that nothing major has been done so far is because most ofthe people who
are infected are black. .. there is an anti black attitude even from the company
clinic." (KI-E) .
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There was a feeling from this African Key Informant that the issue would be addressed
with a greater sense of urgency if the demogmphics were different. About 50% of the
workforce of 1400 employees in this chemical plant comprised Africans.
Although another respondent was rather less committed in her response she seemed to
feel that there were some sections ofmanagement that felt that the IDV/AIDS issue was a
race issue. She mentioned that this attitude was there among some people in top
positions. She herselfwas white.
"There are some mumblings from management that this disease affects black
people but we ignore these attitudes... they feel that IDV/AIDS affects this group
because ofthe cultural attitudes of black men. I do not know ifmore would be
done ifit was felt that white people were as affected.... .1 couldn't say." (KI-M)
The fact that the IDV/AIDS issue was compounded by the race factor was also apparent
in another response. One respondent, an Indian, felt that "there was a lot of silence
surrounding the disease, especially from certain sections ofthe workforce. He said,
"The black staffespecially are reluctant to speak about the AIDS issue because
most believe it is a black issue."(KI-I)
It is interesting to note that of the 70 employees in company I, 700,!o were Indians and
only 10% were blacks. Despite this, the Indian respondent singled out the black workers
when the issue ofIDv/AlDS was brought up. He did not have a clearans~ as to why
he came to this conclusion. This perhaps indicates that it is his personal perception that
the issue is a race issue. The fact that race is such a factor where IllV/AIDS is concerned .
serves to complicate the issue even further. It colors peoples' attitudes and acts as a bias
so there is a stereotype that is created and there is further externalisation of the problem
by people who feel safe by virtue ofthe fact that they are not black.
The issue ofIDV/AIDS being a race issue was intimately linked to the skill factor. This is
to Say that besides the attribution ofthe disease to black cultural attitudes, the majority of
black people occupied the unskilled and semi- skilled positions. There was the feeling
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among some of the respondents that because the disease was seen to affect those who
were less skilled, it was not such a major issue. The fact that "the semi- and unskilled
sectors of the workforce comprised black people thus seems to further polarise the issue
into a black and white one.
''It is the workers who are seen to be easily replaceable who are affected. I feel
that ifthis was not the case, more would be done." (KT-E)
Thus, the question of who is affected is important, as it seems to determine whether or
not the disease is defined as an immediate problem or not If the black semi and
unskilled workers are the ones who are infected it may not be such a problem, more So
when it not the direct responsibility of the company to hire people. Outsourcing was
becoming a common practice,
"It is a pity because before the outsourcing, we used to pay the workers more. The
labour companies pay them less... we may go back to how it was before. Right
now, when we need workers, we just infonnthe labour company. I suppose that is
why we are not feeling the impact ofthe recent deaths."(KI-G)
"It is not our direct responsibility to find employees. Perhaps the impact will be
felt elsewhere. The fact that there is outsourcing makes our task more manageable
and ensures that we stay in business." (KT-M)
"The thing is that the problem is not being felt as such because ofcontracting by x
company. The responsibility offinding workers has been shifted to them.'~ (KI-K)
Thus, in some instances the full impact is not felt because there is a reliance on this
seeming endless supply oflabour. This solution seems to be short term and may create a
false sense of security for the company. It may be the case that this scenario discourages
a proactive approach by business and removes some ofthe pressure for employers to act
There is the shifting of responsibility in some cases to the labour companies with the
assumption that there is an endless supply of labour. However, it is not ideal for
"companies to have a high staff turnover and even where the labour is unskilled, there is
often a period oftime where productivity falls as the new employee tries to settle into the
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job. Besides this, this solution is not feasible where there is a need for skilled workers~ It
is only a matter of time before there is a shortage of skills due to mv/AIDS and it is
important for companies to develop responses now that will cushion them in the future
instead ofshifting the responsibility to someone else.
It seems clear that as long as mY/AIDS is being defined mainly as a problem of death
and loss ofworkers to the company, then perhaps the ultimate solution will be sought in
outsourcing. This may not go to the route ofthe problem and ifthe issue is not addressed, .
it is companies that are going to suffer in the long run.
HI\l/AIDS is also defined as a disease to which a lot of stigma is attached. Because of
this there is secrecy surrounding the disease and there are unexpected effects.
''People are really reacting to the disease. The effects are tremendous. Fat people
are becoming the envy ofthe factory. People are so afraid to be associated with
his illness that they are overeating and going to the gym so that they can gain
weight" (KI-G)
~'The workeIS associate IDV/AIDS with loss ofweight. Even slight weight
loss is to be avoided by all means. People are getting overweight and although
this brings other complications ofhealth, they are not concerned about that. They
are only concerned about people thinking that they have AIDS." (KI-K)
Here again we see what is a somewhat dangerous confusion ofIDV and AIDS. It may be
that people are not as educated as they should be about this illiless. In met, emaciation
does not occur immediately with this disease and it is at this seemingly healthy stage that .
ipfected people can really spread the virus. The fulse sense ofsecurity that is obtained by
people and their partners who gain weight is dangerous as well as ill informed. Where
this type of reasoning is manifest and people in key positions are aware of it, there is the
question ofwhether enough is being done to educate employees about this disease and to
get rid of their misconceptions. There is no sufficient awareness of how the disease
manifests itself at its different stages. Thus, the misconceptions about IDV/AIDS still
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prev~l in the workplace and there are the predominant stereotypes associated with the
disease.
"When a worker is suffering from tuberculosis, he has to go-to the company clinic-- .
to get the medication: People do not like to collect this medication because it is in
full view ofthe other workers in the waiting room and everyone associates TB
with AIDS." (KI-E)
IllV/AIDS is often still associated with gay men and because sexandrelated issues are
seen as taboo, this reinforces the stigma. There is sometimes a feeling of hopelessness
and resignation- feelings which may go a long way in explaining the ineffectiveness or
non- existence of educational campaigns aimed at changing the attitudes of workers and
making them better informed.
"There is stigma, not only in the company but in the greater community as well
and this has a negative impact on those who are infected. It also impacts on others
and sometimes there is a feeling, almost ofmtalism or resignation. Like everyone
is going to get 'this thing' and die." (KI-L)
"Some people seem to have a very casual attitude toward the issue... they do
not seem to care about the possibility that they may be infected. It is as though
they are saying 'too bad... ifI am positive, I am positive.' This is a very
dangerous attitude."(KI-F)
The realisation that this is a very dangerous attitude does little to help the fact that the
workers do not seem to have a sufficient grasp of the issues concerning mY/AIDS.
Education and awareness is supposed to enlighten workers about the issues and it is
worrying that there were such feelings of despair and hopelessness. This frame of mind
may not be fruitful for educational campaigns and awareness. The employees seem to be
a fur way offfrom internalising the-messages ofprevention as well as positive living.
. The employees did not seem to have sufficient motivation to go for testing for
IDV/AIDS. Perhaps this is also testament to the fact that not enough had been done to
quell their fears and show them the attributes oftesting,
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"The majority of the workers feel that they are better ofnot knowing their status."
(KI-G)
"Testing does not help because the attitude from some people is, 'personally I
don't want to know.'" (KI-H)
This is a problem as testing is potentially a very important intervention. It is crucial that
employees understand the value oftesting so that it is not seen merely as an ordeal to be
encountered. The responses show that the companies seem incapacitated by ignorance of
ho"Yto deal With mY/AIDS. Perhaps the problem seems too overwhelming. However, it
is clear that without testing other interventions may not have the intended impact and
there is no use having ad hoc interventions with no systematic response to the problem. If
it is a known mct that employees are not well informed enough to let go of their
misconceptions and that they are too afraid to go for an mY/AIDS test perhaps we can
.draw some conclusions about the approach of the company. There has to be some
response to problems such as these.
Another attitude th~t was uncovered was that it was not mir for companies to spend a lot
ofmoney on mY/AIDS interventions because the disease was a personal health issue and
perhaps it was not the responsibility of the company to deal with it Also, it was not fair
for companies to spend So much on people who were not going to change their cultural
attitudes no matter what was done. Many of the respondents felt that one of the major
problems fu.ced was that of finance. mv/AIDS was seen to be costing the companies
especially in terms oftmining imd retraining. Itwas particularly difficult for companies to
cope when people who were dying were younger persons whose service had been
relatively short,
"... one individual who passed away a month ago was a tminee... this is very
expensive and the company has no assurance that the employee will be healthy
enough to complete th~ training and be productive. A big challenge is the conflict
between benevolence and humanitarianism and the company's productivity." (KI-
B)
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"It is very expensive for the company to train apprentices. It costs about R60, 000
over a period ofthree years. All the apprentices are Africans. We have no
guarantee that an individual will not filII ill during the training period or-after .
it. .. you just don't know." (KI-F)
Both respondents felt that because mY/AIDS testing was prohibited by law, it was
impossible to estimate how long the productive life of the employee would be. Another
respondent said that although there was no discrimination, it was true to say that the
company would not hire s~meone who did not appear healthy enough for the job. This
sta~ment was contradictory. The company she represented was a maize mill and she
explained that there was a lot of lifting and people were required to carry heavy things.
She said,
"Physical strength is ajob requirement and we cannot employ someone who does
not appear strong enough for the job... training would generally not be offered to a
person who is too sick.." (KI-M)
Whereas all the respondents were quick to point out. that there would be no
discrimination, these are the attitudes that were uncovered. This raises the question of
what would happen IT: there was pre- employment testing done by these companies. Also,
the question arises here of who detennines whether or not an individual is too ill- what
. .
criteria are used to conclude that an individual is not strong enough for the job. There is
the possibility that policy is being made here and implemented outside the agreed upon
guidelines.. The criteria are subjective and open to prejudice and this is a very
unsystematic response to the problem of mY/AIDS. The fact that pre-employment
lllV/AIDS testing is prohibited by law is not a guarantee that there will be no
discrimination on hiring and training. It seems to leave room for guessing as employers
try to d,etermine whether or not individuals are ill. It is also important to determine what
the purpose oftesting is.
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Again we see the point that sometimes individuals feel that it is not up to the employer to
intervene when an individual is HIV positive. However, this reasoning fails to recognise
the fact that HIV/AIDS is a problem for everyone and that business will have a stake in it
as well. It does-no good-to .projectthe disease onto the other and reduce it to a matter of·
finance and saving costs. In fact, it is ironical that all the respondents who brought the
question of cost had made no attempt to investigate all the alternatives when trying to
deal with the disease. Perhaps in the long run it would be cheaper to have interventions
that focussed on prolonging the life ofIllV positive employees rather than doing nothing
until they succumbed to the illness. These options had not been meaningfully explored
and perhaps it was because there was a fear of cost and mY/AIDS was not an issue that
waS defined as a high priority.
2.3 Intervention Programmes
Although the companies discussed above did not have policies specific to mY/AIDS,
they were asked about any interventions or programmes that they had. The following
table is a record of their responses.
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Table 2: Intervention Progmmmes
COMPANY CONDOM EDUCATIONAL VOLUNTARY COUNSELLING
PROVISION TESTING
TALKS PLAYS PAMPHLETS
A x x Compulsory
B x x x x
C
D x x x
E x x x x x x
F x x x x x
G x x x x x
H x x x x x
I x x
J x x x x x
K x x
L x x x x x
M x x x x
N x
0
Above is a table reflecting the most common responses that were given. The table shows
that eleven of the fifteen companies made condoms available to employees. There were
interventions that were educational and these mainly included organising group or
individual talks, providing pamphlets and information leaflets and staging plays. Only
two companies had had a play performed on site and seven companies had organised
some type of talks for employees. The table also reflects the fact that nine companies
provided access to voluntary testing. The counselling column reflects the companies that
offered counselling on site at the occupational health clinic. There was no big difference
. in the intervention of the companies according to the size of their workforce besides the
fact that all the companies that did not provide condoms in the workplace were relatively
small. Also, these are the companies that did not have medical personnel on their staff
39
2.3.1 Condoms
This was the most common and consistent response that was given by the Key
Informants. However, Key-Informants-C,.!; Nand 0 had-not made condoms available to
the workers at the workplace.
"1 personally suggested having condoms in the toilet but this was rejected because
it would be offensive to some ofthe people that we work closely with. However, 1
feel that it is important that we ensure that there is access to condoms _in the
workplace." (KI-C)
An~ther ofthe respondents who worked in a retail store said that although there was little
that was being done in this particular store.
"The factories are doing a lot more. There, they provide condoms to the workers."
(KI-I)
Perhaps here again we see the attitude that HlV/AIDS belongs in a certain category of
race and class. This is inferred from the filet that the retail store comprised 70% Indians
and only 10% Africans and here there was no condom provision. On the other hand the
fuetory which comprised of a majority of black workers was provided with condoms.
This was the respondent who felt that the black workers did not want to discuss -
HIV/AIDS because they felt that it was a black issue.
The informants who stated that they provided condoms were not very optimistic about
the effectiveness ofthis intervention,
''We do provide condoms but people will not necessarily change their sex lives.
Condom use is up but it is intermittent Take birth control. ...there is birth control
on site but out of fifteen women ofchild bearing age, three were pregnant within
- . four months oftheir employment" (KI-B)
"Although we provide condoms,. there are so many issues surrounding that
People do not know that they are supposed to use condoms even ifthey are HIV
positive... there is also a resistance to condom use by some people. Some of the
workers have said to me that they do not like to use condoms because when they
40
suggest it, their wives think that they are cheating on them. It is like a vicious
circle. There is only so much you can do with condom use. You cannot force
people....you cannot be sure that they are doing what they should." (KI-G)
"The'women iri"iliis factory are not receptive to the condom. Itry'tO"tel1"them that
they are even more at risk ofcontracting thevirus but they do not seem to hear. At
the end ofthe day, it is difficult to change peoples' attitudes." (KI-K)
Another said that there were condom dispensers for the truck drivers and there were also
condoms provided for the rest ofthe employees. There was the collection ofup to 1,000
condoms a week from 90 employees. However, she too expressed concern,
''I have talked to some people who felt that they would rather not use them. h is
difficult to tell whether they are practicing safe sex and whether they are doing it
correctly." (KI-O)
This respondent had reported earlier that STI's were common among the workers. These
are some ofthe opinions that were expressed by the interviewees about the problems that
were associated with the use of condoms. The general feeling was more or less one of
helplessness. Condom use could not be enforced or monitored. This they felt was
challenging perhaps especially so because condom use was presented as one ofthe major
interventions. The high number of condoms taken from the workplace could mean that
the employees were also distributing them to their friends and possibly not making use of
them. There was a feeling that was really no way of knowing the extent to which
condoms were effective.
There was a general perception among respondents that in the final analysis, people had
to take responsibility for their own sexual behaviour and that little could be done to
.change this fact Whereas it is evident that individuals must take personal responsibility
for their actions, the attitude that IllV/AIDS is a purely personal health issue is a
misleading one. This is a disease that has had and will have fur- reaching social and
economic consequences. Business would do well to realise that it has a stake in this issue
especially if nothing is done now. Perhaps there is feeling that businesses are
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incapacitated by the overpowering nature ofthe problem and there is a lack ofknowledge
of how to proceed and what to do. At any rate, it is wonying to have heard these types of
sentiments expressed by the informants who seemed to feel that their most popular
intervention was less· than effective despite the fii.ct that it was the most sustained
intervention that was mentioned. Thus, there were definitely weaknesses in the focus of
interventions on condom provision and these were·evident in the statements of the key
informants.
This focus on condom provision did not take too much account of the stage of the
disease. Thus, there had been no attempts to investigate or pursue other interventions that
might be more fruitful and relevant All the companies that were doing something were
mainly providing condoms and there had been little or no consideration for example of
interventions that managed opportunistic infections and improved the quality of life.
These are the interventions that could prolong the productive life ofan individual.
There were other activities and programmes that were mentioned but they were erratic,
irregular and not very effective.
2.3.2 Talks
Not all the companies had organised presentations to be made for their employees. Below
is a· table showing the companies that organized educational talks. It also reflects the
regularity ifthese talks.
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TableJ: Regularity ofEducational Group Talks
REGULARITY OF GROUP TALKS CONIPANIES
Never A, B, C, D, E, K, L, N,O
Once in the Past Two Years G,H,M
Twice iD. the past Two Years F, I
Company J is not in the above table because the company had an AIDS awareness month
and there were also nined peer- educators who were accessible to workers at all times.
The state of a.ffiUrs regarding education of employees was not a very good one. The
company that was represented by Key Informant J is the only one that had a sustained
programme ofeducation. Ongoing education and re- education campaigns are essential to
reinforce and promote safe sexual behaviour as well as to inform workers in a meaningful
and effective way. This was not done, according to the responses ofthe interviewees.
"We have had educational talks twice this year... an educator from 'Info AIDS'
came to talk to the workers ... We also had a workshop where the families ofthe
employees were invited. There"were talks, competitions and prizes and :we even
provided transportation to the site where this is necessary." (KI-F)
The other Key Informant (1), whose company had had talks twice during the year
reported' that someone, from ATICC (AIDS Training, Information and Counselling
Centre) had come to speak to the staff twice. Key Informants G, H, and M all reported
that once in the past two years there was a guest speaker who had been invited to speak to "
the workers.
Some ofthe Key Informants said that although they had not organised group talks, they




"The doctor takes it upon himselfto take about five minutes ofhis time to talk to
the employees who go and see him." (KI-E)
''We cannot organise group talks as this will disrupt production..so it is.upto the
.nurse to make factory rounds and talk to the people then one by one. Each
employee is called aside. This is done frequently. We see it as an advantage as
people are freer to ask questions when they are being spoken to in private." (KI-
K)
Key fuformant L said that this year talks were not on the list ofactivities but that it would
be there next year.
As we can see, where they existed, the talks were irregular and there was no continuity.
This begs the question ofwhether these presentations had any meaningful impact on the
understanding of the employees. Moreover, one reported that even when there was a talk,
only the black employees attended. This was about halfofthe entire workforce. She said,
"There is still a need for education but... only the black workers
attended... perhaps the rest feel that they know enough about the disease." (KI-M)
When attendance was not. made compulsory it may defeat the whole purpose of
organising such an activity with the purpose of educating people. Perhaps, too, the fact
that l?eople in management positions and those of other races did not attend the talk will
have a damaging impact It sends a clear message about peoples' perceptions and this
may not be good for the morale of the workers or their understanding of the disease. It
may also give workers a signal that the issue is not an important one.
Besides the problems of irregularity and inconsistency in organising educational talks,
and the mct that attendance was not always compulsory, there were only five companies
that had organised any educational talks at all for their employees. It is clear that, in this
case, the companies were not taking the initiative of educating the workers and this was




Only two companies reported that they had had an educational play on site during the
year. One stated that R40, 000 had been spent on this. He seemed confused about whether
or not he felt that the play had been a success,
"The play was successful but how do you measure success?" (KI-E)
This· statement. is contmdictoryand it indicates a level of uncertainty from a lack of
standards that measure success. Thus there may have been money spent on a play but
there did not seem to be a target that was set or criteria that were pre determined to
evaluate the success of this intervention. The other respondent felt that,
"The play was powerful. ...we closed the :fu.ctory and we included the
community... .it was adopted to fit the older generation and it was in languages. I
feel that it was a s~ccess as people were talking about it for months after the
event." (KI-L)
There had been no standards set to determine the level ofsuccess ofthis intervention. The
plays were staged but there were no pre- determined criteria for measuring their success.
Both respondents unfortunately reported that few or no individuals went for testing after
the play. In addition. there was still the report that STrs were common among workers-
this from KI-L. Attitudes offear of testing did not seem to change among the employees
as we shall see below. It is important to evaluate the success of interventions in order to
figure out what more can be done or what can be done differently. It is thus important to
develop criteria to make these judgments in order to evaluate the impact of interventions
and where this is not done there are likely to be gaps in inforination and this is
problematic. There need to be guides for action so that responses can be systematic.
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2.3.4 Testing
Only eight of the respondents'stated that their companies provided for voluntary testing.
Key Informant A stated that testing for HIVIAIDS was a requirement of law for persons
who worked in the transport industry. He worked for a shipping company. The
respondents were asked about the purpose of testing but they could only say what it was
not for. That is, that it was not for any discriminatory purposes. However, some responses
indicated somewhat different attitudes and opinions. Although the majority of the
. respondents were quick to agree that testing was not. necessary, as it might allow
discrimination to take place as far as training, employment and benefits were concerned,
there were some inconsistent responses.
2.3.4.1 Testing and Discrimination
Two respondents stated that it was expensive for the company to train an individual who·
would not have a long productive life, or who would not even last for the duration ofthe
training
programme. They felt that the government policy of no testing was a problem for the
company.
"One ofthe big challenges is that we are not able to tell who is infected because
ofthe no testing policy ofthe government" (KI-B)
"You just do not know... it is so expensive to train and apprentice... you cannot be
sure whether the individual is ill or not and whether they will be productive at
all." (KI~F)
Another respondent who said that there would be no discrimination of mv positive
persons seemed to be inconsistent in her responses. She felt that, generally speaking, an
individual would not be employed ifhe/she looked like he/she was 'too weak for the job. '
This, she felt would save the company some money in the long run. She said,
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''We act in accordance with the Skills Development Act and the Employment
Equity Act but generally, ifwe felt that an individual was too ill to undergo
training, we would not take him on:" (KI-M)
....
All these respondents seem to be saying in one way or another that people who are HIV
positive may not always be given a fair chance to compete with the rest ofthe workforce
if their status was known. This calls into question the real purpose ofIDV/AIDS testing.
The first two respondents reported the difficulties that they encountered when they had to.
train individuals who they were not sure would be healthy enough to complete the
training and become productive members ofthe workforce. One may ask oneselfwhether
a company would consider training an individual who was known to be mv positive-
this; in spite of the fact that there was supposedly no discrimination ofany kind of such
individuals in both training or hiring practice.
The third respondent felt that in the absence ofthe knowledge of the mv/AIDS status of
an individual when hiring, it was the practice that some kind ofstandard would be used to
d.etermine whether or not the person was fit enough for the job. These standards seemed
vague, unspecific and subjective. We may again consider the repercussions for an
individual of the knowledge by the company of his/her HIV status before the hiring
process. Thus, the whole purpose of testing is an important aspect of lllV/AIDS
interventions.
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2.3.4.2 Purpose of Testing
Understanding the purpose of testing was important. One infOnilant felt that testing was
of little use as,
"There is no immunity against this disease... someone could test negative today
and then test positive tomorrow." (KI-H)
Whereas this is a statement of fact. this attitude seems to be a little narrow and
pessimistic as it does not acknowledge the purposes of testing other than as a punitive
m~ure. Testing could be made to be a useful and positive response. Some respondents
were not specific about what they thought testing was for. The respondents above
expressed concern about hiring and training individuals who were mv positive without
the knowledge ofthis met. This indicates that the understanding ofthe purpose oftesting
was that those found to be IITV positive would be denied access to training programmes
and possibly to employment Thus, testing would be for punitive purposes rather than for
help and support.
People experience anxiety at the prospect of going for an lllV/AIDS test Perhaps if
testing was used as a means ofequipping individuals with information that could improve
their lifestyle or Cause them to cluinge their behaviour, people would be less apprehensive
about getting tested. It is important for companies to have support structures to make
testing a meaningful intervention. Testing is of little value when there is no positive . .
planned response after testing has been done. P~ple must be made to feel that there are
support systems to assist them if they IDfected with lllV/AIDS~ This may make the
prospect ofgoing for the test a little easier to deal with.
Testing as a preventive measure is important and this can be inferred from the fact that
the respondents often stated that the employees were afraid to he tested. They were so
afraid to he found mv positive that many said they would rather not know their status.
Perhaps, even despite the guarantee of confidentiality, they were afraid that their status
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would be revealed and they would be penalised for it Respondent D explained that even
though there was no testing allowed and even after testing, confidentiality was
guaranteed, there were some loop-holes in the system so that the status of an employee
could be discovered. Ifan individual went to the company clinic with symptoms thought···
to be relating to IDV/AIDS, they would be referred to the company doctor. Even if the
medical report did not specify mv status, the diagnosis and prognosis would be pmased
in·such a way as to indicate this fact.
Testing can also be used as a preventive measure through education. It is important to re
educate people who are infected once there is knowledge ofthis fact. This could help to
prevent them from passing the infection to others who are not infected. mv positive
individuals could be trained as peer educators and they may be more effective in
informing the workers who work closely with them.
2.3.4.3 Are Employees Getting Tested? .
. Besides all the issues that surrounded testing and the fact tI;1at not all the companies in
this study provided for it, there were some respondents who said that employees were not
taking advantage ofthe facility. One informant said,
"A majority ofthe employees feel that they would·rather not know their
mv status." (KI-G)
Key InfonnantH was also ofthe opinion that there Were many in the company who did
not want to know their status. Others felt the same.
"Some feel that. .. everyone is going to get 'that thing' and die... there is a lot of
stigma still attached... some would rather not know." (l<I-L)
This fear perhaps .was preventing more people from getting tested. Thus, it seems that
workers were not.made more aware of the potential benefits of testing and perhaps they
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were not made to feel confident that testing was not purely for punitive purposes. In
addition it seems that education, whether it was on a one on one basis or at group leve~
did not impact enough on the workers to encourage them to go for an HIV/AIDS test.
There were-other respondents who reported that no worker had gone for voluntary testing
for the whole year. One ofthe respondents whose company had had a play on the fuctory
site said,
''I do not know... no one on site came for testing after the play. We invited
the community and perhaps we covered more outside." (KI-E)
Another reported that no one had come for testing this year.
"Within the next three years after 1994, ofthose who came for voluntary testing,
18% ofthe workforce tested positive for this disease. No one has come for testing
this year." (KI-H)
Without testing, it may be the case that the other interventions- a good example being
counselling, are not as effective as they would be. Perhaps this is a measure of the
success ofwhat the companies have been doing until now.
2.3.5 CounseDing
This was mentioned by eleven of the respondents as another intervention. Although
counselling is very important aspect of dealing with IllV/AIDS, the question arises of
how effective it is when few or no people are going for IllVIAIDS testing. There was the
mention of pre and post- test counselling and the counselling of individuals who are
infected, as well as their fiunily members ifpossible. All the respondents who referred to
co~elling talked about it in terms of helping the IllV positive individual to live a full
life and giving himJher -hope for the future. There was also talk of giving dietary_
infonnation-and information to improve the quality of life. Thus, this intervention seems
to be effective or largely applicable where there is knowledge of the status of an
individual. In this case then, testing is important.
so
2.4 Resources
The respondents were asked whether they had allocated specific fuiancialarid personnel
resources to realise their policies and programmes. Perhaps it can be inferred from the
data above that the answers to this question were largely negative. In the absence of
policy, money from the budget could not be allocated. In addition, the activities that were
carried out in all of the companies appeared to be irregular and unsystematic. There was
no real effort at consistency and there. were no systematic attempts to follow up on what
. little had been done -for example, the lack of criteria for measuring the success of these
programmes. This seeming lack of structure and long term strategy is not an ideal
situation when resources are bemg allocated. The table below reflects the responses that
were given when the Key Informants were asked whether they had set aside resources for
lllV/AIDS interventions.
The table shows that none ofthe companies had allocated financial resources specifically
to mv/AIDS interventions. On the issue of personnel resources, ten of the companies
stated that the company clinic dealt with mv/AIDS and pertinent issues. The response to
lllV/AIDSwas thus the resp.onsibility of the clinic staff. In general, this comprised very
few individuals whose responsibilities were wide ranging. None of the companies had
allocated specific financial res()urces to realising their policies or programmes.
All the ones who reported that they had personnel charged with the responsibility of
coordinating the programmes and planning th;e interventions said that this was a
responsibility for the company clinic. The company clinic was in most cases staffed by
only one nurse. At least the nurse was the only one who was there during working hours
on a daily basis.
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Table 4: Company's Resource Allocation
COMPANY RESOURCES
.. . .. .. " .
FINANCIAL PERSONNEL
A - -
B - Company Clinic
C - -
D - Company Clinic
·E - Company Clinic
F - Company Clinic
G - Company Clinic
H - Company Clinic
I - -
J - Company Clinic
K -. Company Clinic
L - Company Clinic
M - Company Clinic
N - -
0 .. -
Many of the respondents said that the financial resources for matters connected with
mvlAIDS programmes fell under the Human Resources Department.
"There is a massive training programme in the Human Resources
Department. .. aboutR4, 500 was spent on Health and Safety Training. We also
spent R350 an 'hourfor a training programme from EdulAIDS." (KI-B)
When asked what percentage was dedicated to health issues, the respondent only said that
there was :R195, 000 and this was from a total budget that wasgoing to be trimmed by
R750, 000 in the coming year. She seemed to feel that the allocation was a rather small
. percentage of the whole company budget. The programmes fell under the Human
Resources Department Another company had clinic personnel totalling seven. There was
one doctor who runs the clinic and there were two occupational health nurses and four
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nursing assistants. This was the largest number ofpersonnel who could deal at some level
with the issue ofHIV/AIDS. Another infonnant responded as follows,
"We spend 2% a year on community development, social responsibility and job
creation. mv/AIDS falls within this... we do not intend to increase this
percentage but ifneed be, perhaps mY/AIDS will take a bigger portion ofthe
overall.n (KI-H)
In this company, the nurse was responsible for issues relating to mY/AIDS. Other key
informants reported that,
"The money comes from the Human Resources Department... there was not
enough money for one ofthe programmes so it had to be borrowed from Public
Relations.'; (KI-J)
"The resources that go towards mY/AIDS interventions are part of the normal
clinic costs... we do not skimp on spending money on employees if they are ill."
. (KI-M)
Thus, again we can see a trend towards defining IDV/AIDS as a personal health issue.
The response to the disease is the responsibility ofthe company clinic. It is also defined
in terms of a problem of labour, under human resources and perhaps it is telling that in
one case, it draws from the public relations department. There is a feeling that this issue
.is relegated to a level ofless importance than it should be. It does not demand a budget of
its own and in almost all the cases, one·or two people- one doctor and one nurse-
constitute the total personnel allocated to tackling the company's response. Perhaps there
is a certain degree of tokenism involved in this kind of attitude which seems to indicate
some lack ofcommitment to an issue ofpotential threat to the companies involved.
"The clinic is seen as a liability but the law requires that it be there... there is more
or less an 'open' arrangement as regards the financing ofinterventions. The nurse
draws up a budget ofthe clinic expenses and the money is provided by the
management" (KI~K)
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This seems a rather casual attitude and it reflects the lack of strategy and long term
planning that should characterise a serious response. It must be noted that the budgets
submitted by many ofthe nurses charged with the responsibility constitute the total clinic
'costs and a large part ofthese-consist of the costs of medication. Medication provided, --
when it comes to illV/AlDS simply means the provision of vitamin tablets or pain-
killers. Other than vitamins, medicine is expensive and was not provided by the company.
"We do not supply AZT or cocktails. That is an expensive issue." (KI-M),
Others felt that antibiotics were effective but that AZT was a complex issue that had the
govc;munent involved and was too expensive for companies to get into,
·'It is too expensive. It costs about RI, 500 or something like that" (KI-K)
"All that the nurse can do is' counsel about the diet... the government should
sanction drugs ... " (KI-G)
In this attitude we see that there is a transfer of responsibility to the government when it
comes to medication and a feeling that the company is helpless because ofgovernment
policy on the provision of this medication. However, this seems like a scapegoat in light
of the filet that so little was given toillV/AIDS intervention in the first place. Also, no
real effort had been made to put interventions in place that dealt with opportunistic
infections. Instead, some companies had gone as far as hinting that it was too expensive
for the company to deal with HIVIAIDS and that it would be helpful for the company to
know the status of employees. Thus, the attempts to shift the responsibility onto the
government and the opinions that medication would be provided if it was not expensive
do not sound genuine.
Another respondent (KI-L) stated that it was up to the nurse to draw up a budget for the
clinic and to decide how much would go to mYlAIDS. Another simply had this to say,
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'We do not have a special budget for mY/AIDS but hopefully we will in the near
future." (KI-F)
The company clinic bore the responsibilitY of dealing with the mY/AIDS issue and it
was up k;' the ~~rse to pr~~dec~illiselling. dietary support and' advice"on how to live
with mY/AIDS. Some of the respondents admitted that this was stressful to the nurses
but that nothing could be done about this met because of lack of resources. The nurse
from company J felt that,
"I am not doing justice to the job. During our AIDS awareness month, we offered
free testing and 1had to counsel all the employees who took advantage ofthe
service. I feel that there is a need for more staff'and I have been saying this for
years but each time I bring it up 1am told that due to money matters they cannot
employ anyone else." (Nurse from Company 1)
The nurse from company L stated that she did the personnel work as well and although
this was good as it gave her a bigger picture of the profile of the worker, it was
emotionally draining and time consuming. She said.
''It is very emotionally taxing especially because ofthe issue of confidentiality. I
feel that I have quite a bit to deal with... I do not foresee a remedy in the near
future. I deal with it on a personal level through stress management and physical
exercise." (Nurse from Company L)
These are two ofthe nurses from the companies that were included in the study. They felt
that m.anagement was not addressing the issue ofcapacity to implement the programmes
that were in place. They mentioned the counselling which they wereresponsible for and
which was very taxing. This was just one ofthe aspects that they were responsible for.
It seems that besides the fact the interventions that were in place were not very effective
as regards the level ofsuccess there was also the issue ofthe commitment ofmanagement
to allocate Iesources to these interventions. This perhaps tells the loudest tale regarding
priority. It was the case more often than not that HlV/AIDS related expenses were
defined in terms ofliability for the company. This seems like a short - tenn view ofthe
problem
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Thus, the company clinic was charged with dealing with all issues relating to HIV/AIDS.
This was done in conjunction with the Human Resources Department only as fur as
monetary issues were concerned. Where there was no clinic, the issue was seen as a
personnel person problem regardless ofwhether this individual had sufficient expertise to
deal with it. One respondent said,
"One issue that I feel has to be addressed is the job definition ofa Human
Resources Manager... .is he a Human Resources Manager or a Health Hygienist?"
(KI-H)
IDV/AIDS was not an issue that was made part and parcel ofthe planning strategy ofthe
company. There is definitely a need for companies to get into grips ~th the situation so
that they can see that there is a real stake in it and that it requires more attention that it is
being given at least in the companies in this study.
2.5 Success orFailure
We have seen that most ofthe companies did not have policies specific to HIV/AIDS.
There were mixed feelings that were expressed by the informants about the success of
any activities that geared toward dealing with the disease. Some felt that th~y were doing
all tJ:1ey could. They projected the rest of the responsibility onto the labour companies or
the politicians and the government,
"There is still a need for education... the comments that·Mbeki has made have left
many people confused about this disease." (KI-M)
" ... our policies seem to be effective... the thing is that the responsibility has
. shifted to the labour contractors... on the issue of medication, AZT is expensive
and this is more ofa government thing." (KI-K)
These statements were made even though the companies were not doing much to begin
with. Furthennore, the filet. that contracting companies were responsible for providing
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labour does not mean that the company is not responsible for the welfare of the workers.
Others, who were doing little or nothing, surprisingly felt that they were successful. Most
of the time, success was defined in terms of what was perceived as an increased level of
.. awareness among workers; ....
"Yes, our policies are effective. There is a lot ofawareness." (KI-G)
"I think that the workers are a hundred percent aware ofAIDS." (KI-E)
"The policy has been in place for just over a year and we are thinking ofrevisiting
it now. However, we seem to have been successful in creating awareness." (KI-H)
"The factories do a lot more than we do... they provide condoms. In the sense of
creating awareness, I think we have been successful." (KI-I)
"Yes. Our programmes and policies are effective. People are responding freely
and openly and are moving from the stigma oftalking about AIDS." (KI-L)
KI-L was from a company where the workers had not gone for mY/AIDS testing in a
while. This raises the question of what criteria are used for determining that awareness
had increased. This is especially so in light of the fact that KI..L reported that STI's were
still common among the workers and that many of the other informants felt that condoms
were used only intermittently. Some did not want to use condoms at all. It is not useful
.for people to be aware ofsomething but to fail to change therr behaviour as a result Also,
it is important to use certain criteria in order to determine whether or not there is indeed
awareness. Awareness does not always translate to a proper linderstanding.
"'There is only so much we c8.n do....condom use is intermittent and people will
not necessarily change their sex lives." (KI-B)
Here again it is evident that the major intervention was the provision ofcondoms and that
IDV/AIDS was defined as a cultural or personal issue and that the company could do
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little about this. Others had the same sense ofhopelessness stemming from ignorance and
lack ofsureness about what to do.
"No... our policies and programmes may noi be very effective. Maybe we are not
prepared for the future. But how do we prepare? Employ ten percent more people
to replace the ten percent who will die?" (KI-E)
This is a passive approach to the problem and it does not require any planning at all.
Perhaps this attitude stems from lack of knowledge and the overwhelming nature of the
problem. It is more or less a wait and see approach which was evident elsewhere.
"Our policies seem to be effective for the moment but ifanything happens, it will
be up to the management to figure out a way to react to the situation." (KI-K)
There was more evidence that mY/AIDS was treated as a personal health issue that the
company could do little about
"We can only. encourage employees to belong to medical aid schemes and
perhaps subsidize them a little. Senior management have this mcility but it is
expensive for the rank and file." (KI-E)
Again, mY/AIDS is defined as a personal health issue. From -the respondents who felt
that they had been successful. it seems thatthere was a sort ofdenial. This is because it is
clear from their previous responses that little was being done and that even this had not
borne too much fruit There was also the met that there were no established.'criteria for
detennining success. Denial is not only a psychological response where there is denial of
the problem. It is a social response as well as it excuses inaction. Thus, it is also a milure
to act or to recognise the futility ofaction taken.
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Possible Reasons why No One Seems to be Doing Enough
We have seen that a number ofrespondents felt that a challenge that was mced was what
was seen as the cultural attitudes and practices that undermine attempts at education and
awareness. We must note that in all the companies, Africans comprised 45% to 80% of
the total workforce. Key Informant K reported that when an employee's death was AIDS
related, some African workers would attribute it to witchcraft. This was a company which
comprised 82% Africans out of 500 workers. Respondent M pointed out that there was a
section of management that felt that HlV/AIDS was prevalent because of 'black men's
cultural attitudes.' Thus, Africans were felt to be attributing the disease to other causes or
behaving in ways that put them at higher risk. This was believed by some of the Key
Informants to be a result of cultural influences and there was therefore a senSe that little
could be done to educate these individuals or persuade them away from their cultural
beliefs.
Key Informants B and G (both white) felt that the bottom line was that condom use could
. .
not be enforced or monitored. Respondents B, K and L suggested that there was a certain
resistance to condom use. Respondent K (Indian), from a company employing 82%
Africans and 65% women, stated that 'women were not receptive to the condom.' This,
they felt was challenging, perhaps especially so because the provision of condoms was
presented as one of the more major interventions. This was also tied to cultural values
and perceptions relating to condom use. There was also, here, a feeling of helplessness
because many felt that it waS really up to the individual to decide whether or not they
would use a condom and little could be done about this. There was a general perception
among most respondents that at the end of the day, people had to take responsibility for
their own sexUal behaviour. Thus, IllV/AIDS was more or less viewed as a personal
. health issue as though the company did not have a stake in the lives of its employees or a





There also seemed to be a feeling among some of the respondents there was an inherent
conflict between the goals of the organization - profit making. and the practices of the
organization in connection with mY/AIDS and employees. This perhaps stems from the
opinions discussed. above ,that cast mY/AIDS as a personal health issue' intimately'
connected to a cultuml inclination. The company was there to make a profit and not to
perform a social service. Thus. perhaps anything that was doneby the company by way
of intervention was seen as a sort ofgood will gesture.
These are some of the attitudes that were uncovered and they all seemed to remove any
responsibility from the company and place it fully on the individual or the society. Where
companies were doing something about mY/AIDS there was an opinion commonly
expressed that this was out of good will mther than a sense of responsibility or a
realisation that the company had much at stake. The question of the understanding of
mY/AIDS and the challe~ges that it poses is important because it ultimately determines
the responses and interventions that are put in place. Ifthe understanding is not sufficient,




The IDV/AIDS epidemic poses multiple challenges for a country like South Africa.
There is a lot of debate about the accuracy of various projections but it is clear that
IllV/AIDS is not only a personal health issue but a developmental issue as well. It may
have major institutional impacts and this may have a bearing on the functioning of
companies. We have seen that businesses may have to spend more money to retrain
workers to replace those that die as a result ofthe disease. Also) productivity will fall due
'to inissed workdays. This study has been concerned with corporate policy on lllV/AIDS
interventions. It has investigated the understandmg ofthe issue oflllV/AIDS among the
key informants from :fifteen companies. The study found that not all the companies in the
sample had policies specific to mY/AIDS but that most had general guidelines. There
was a feeling from the key informants that the companies would react as the problems
arose and that at the moment the problem was being effectively dealt with. Most of the
companies dealt with mY/AIDS positive employees on a case by case basis. Below is a
discussion of the findings ofthe study within the context of the rational choice model.
3.1 The Rational Choice Model and HIVIAlDS Policy
Policy- making and implementation are complex processes that do not· automatically
follow a rational model. However) the rational choice model could help us to understand
the policy process) especially when studied in conjunction with other human metors. This
is because) as we have seen) human rationality is limited due to numerous filctors.
The companies in this study seemed to be doing little regarding mY/AIDS in the
workplaee and this was surprising perhaps because of the projections that tell us that
businesses will be affected. Despite the economic forecasting. however) there was a
feeling that information is not alwayS accurate and there was a feeling of confusion and
uncertainty about this. Some of the key informants felt that they did not know which
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estimates they should rely on. This may -be a limit to rationality- the incomplete and
fragmented nature ofknowledge.
mv/AIDS is a disease laden with a great deal of stigma. People hesitate to go for
mv/AIDS tests and those who-do are often reluctant to disclose their status. Thus, it is
not always easy for companies to make projections of the impact of the disease on their
workforce. Many ofthe key informants expressed feelings ofhelplessness at this fact and
felt that they could do little if people were not willing to come forWard and be tested.
Some felt that it was necessary for them to know the statistics regarding infection rates
among their employees so that they could plan their responses appropriately according to
. .
the' stage of the epidemic. Perhaps there would be differences in emphasis of the
interventions in relation to the rates ofinfection.
Thus, there was a point that was made that the knowledge of the status of employees
would be important for the companies to respond. This knowledge may be important in
order for a planned and strategic response that is relevant Perhaps an example of this
would be that the-companies could stress their efforts on preventive education in cases
where infection rates are low. Where there is a high rate of infection, there could _be
education as well as a stress on interventions that deal with opportunistic infections. The
response cannot be rational where there are gaps in knowledge and information.
However, it is the case that where there is information, it may be used in ways that do not
necessarily confOml to the original objectives ofthe policy. This was uncovered through
some of the statements made by the key informants. Although many were quick to point
out that their policies or guidelines were all in confor:Qlity with the law and with national
policy on testing, there were certain facts that were uncovered that were not consistent
with this assurance.
The national policy on testing is careful to protect HIv/AIDS positive individuals from
discrimination at the workplace. Thus, testing should only be voluntary. Moreover, ther~
should be a guarantee of confidentiality for those who do not desire to disclose their
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status. However, it became apparent from some of the statements made by the key
informants that there were some problems in connection with the implementation ofthis
aspect ofthe policy. Firstly, although there was a general feeling that discrimination was
.unnecessary and-that it was frowned upon in the policies and practices ofthe variuus
companies, it was clear that the issues of testing and its purpose were surrounded by
some confusion. Where on one hand there was an embracing of national policy and the
declaration that an employee would not be discriminated against on the basis of
mY/AIDS status, the purpose of testing was not clearly defined. Where there was a
voluntary testing policy there was no demonstration of a grasp of why testing was vita~
especially in light of the fact that there were no structures thatwere in place to deal With
the 8ftermath oftesting. Thus there was the question ofwhat sort ofresponse there would
be after an employee had gone for an IDV/AIDS test and then revealed his/her status to
the employer.
It.was discovered in the course of various interviews that testing would perhaps serve
another purpose, quite contrary to that stipulated in policy regarding IllV/AIDS. Some
key informants felt that it was unfair for the company to carry the costs of training IllV
positive individuals who would not have a long productive life and may not even last for
the course of the training. Thus, Inadvertently they were saying that testing would be a
means for discrimination- for selecting individuals who would be trained at a cheaper
cost to the company. This was the logic of cost benefit analysis. It was seen to be a more
cost- effective option to be aware of the status of employees- instead of taking a gamble
that the company would benefit from long service in the long run. Thus, it is evident that
in some cases, testing could potentially be used as a basis for some sort ofdiscrimination,
inconsistent with the. aims of the national policy that so many companies· seem to
embrace. Perhaps tins can be explained in a number ofways.
. Firstly,· social indicators are important in this situation. The issue on IllV/AIDS is a
topical issue and there has been a lot of discussion and controversy surrounding it This
means that companies, especially big business, in the public eye are under some sort of
pressure to respond to IllV/AIDS in the workplace. AIDS activists are also keen to
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propagate the HIV/AIDS cause and these factors may all put pressure on companies to
act Thus there may be a hasty embracing of national policy without a real effort to
analyse its content. This is because it may seem politically correct for companies to be
seen to; be -supporting the politically correct policies -of voluntary testing and no
discrimination and embrace the general guidelines and policies regarding the issue.
Perhaps the social cost ofappearing callous or unconcerned with the issue ofHIV/AIDS
prompted companies to act fast This seems like a quick fix mentality. There was, among
the companies in this study, little effort to develop policies relevant to the needs of the
particular company. Instead, there was a trend towards adopting guidelines that were
general and were developed as a basic starting point for companies to build on.
It was clear that a number of those who responded were not fully aware ofthe spirit in
which the policies were developed and the intentions of it The voluntary testing policy
entails quite a bit more than just providing counselling before and after. Also, it requires
that companies develop interventions that are supportive of those who have opted to go
for testing. Ifthis does not happen, testing may indeed become nothing more than a tool
for discrimination.
Thus, it is clear that rationalitY is limited by the organisational environment- for example,
whether or not the company is proactive in terms of problem solving. These are the
factors that frame the processes ofchoice. This means that individuals can only act within
the constraints of the organisation and its policies. If these policies have not been
developed in house, it may be more difficult at least in the sense of understanding the
policy. If there is no understanding of the policy then implementation will be poor. If
there is little or no attempt to decipher the guidelines and to tailor them to the specific
needs of the company, perhaps policy will be less effective in achieving it ends.
Companies should not be satisfied with tokenism;' embracmg national policy with neither
.sufficient input from themselves nor a sufficient grasp ofwhat the policy entails.
In addition to the organisational context, rationality is also limited by.the fact that
IDV/AIDS cases were dealt with on a case by case basis. This is not only time consuming
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but subject to human error and bias as well. This system of-dealing with the problem
results from the fact that the available guidelines were insufficient and lacked enough
substance to react to the different situations that presented themselves. Thus, a common
response that was-given-by the-key informants when they were asked-about what they -
would do if an employee became too sick to work was that each case was dealt with
differently. This means that there were situations that required on the spot improvisation
because few -of the issues were dealt with in the policy. Some of the key informants
mentioned the fact that numerous mctors were considered when dealing with an
employee who had become too ill to work. These were mctors such as the previous
conduct of the employee, for example, whether the individual was thought to be a good
woiker or to have a disruptive influence.- Factors such as job performance and attendance
were also taken into consideration. When there are no clear- cut rules and regulation to
guide decision- making, there is room for subjectivity and this reduces the chances of
rationality. The absence ofofficial policy leaves room for improvisation and the creation
ofpolicy even as it is being implemented.
This is the same with the issue of testing. Although the official stance was one against
discrimination on the basis ofmY/AIDS status, this was not always the case in practice.
We have seen that rationality is limited especially when there are no clear policies to
guide action. In the absence of policy, there is more room to adjust behaviour according
to purposive goals. When goals are felt to conflict with each other, perhaps the goal that
is defined as priority wins the day. In any case, in such a situation, implementation may
become haphazard- a juggling act. An example of this is where there seems to be a
conflict between the goals of. the organisation and what may be seen as social or
humanitarian goals. In the· first case, the goals of the organisation may be profit making
and in a cost- benefit analysis sense it may not be feasible to train or employ an
individual who is mY positive. However, business may have a social conscience and
may want to support people who are mv positive. Thus, implementation will depend on
who decides which goals take precedence and whether or not there can be a compromise.
This is the human element that could· be a limit to rationality and it is where
implementation may dep8.rt from official policy.
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The fact that pre- employment testing is against the law does not necessarily prevent
employers from discriminating. In some situations, the individual doing the recruiting
··may adopt a policy of simply observing the prospective employee in trying to determine
whether he/she appears to be fit and healthy. This may seem naive and may border on the
ludicrous. However, one key informant felt that in the circumstances, it was within the
rights ofthe company to do whatever it could to try and ensure that they would not suffer
the financial consequences ofemploying someone who would not have a long productive
life. This is a very dangerous and discriminatory practice. Besides the filet that it is by no
means foolproof in achieving the desired ends, it is seen as a means of getting around
whit is prescribed by law. This is all in an attempt to limit the costs oftrying to deal with
lllV/AIDS in the workplace. However, it does not seem rational at all. Trying to avoid
the problem is not a practical response.
In the same way, even though policy stipulates that general medical check ups are not
supposed to indicate in any way the mv/AIDS status ofan employee, it was discovered
that here again there were loopholes. One infonnant mentioned that there was at times an
underst;mding between the company doctor and the management so that a diagnosis
phrased in a particular way would mutually be understood to constitute a disclosure ofthe
positive status ofthe employee. Therefore it is clear that policy is being made even as it is
being implemented and official policy is not always consistent with what is actually
happening. This is because people react to situations as they arise, depending on how
they define the problem as well as the priorities- again the human element comes into
play. Although it is perhaps true to say that in each situation action is taken after there is
an attempt to weigh the costs and benefits it is clear that the proceSses of choice are
framed within a particular context Individuals realise how much freedom they have to
act within the context of their organisations. and they are aware of their agendas and
priorities.
Individuals may have discretion in applying policy. This is especially so where a. .
particular issue is not defined as high priority and there is no regular evaluation of the
policy. Ofcourse, where there are only general guidelines, as we have seen, there is even
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more room for flexibility and personal interpretation and thus, the introduction of bias.
The rational model of implementation does not give this due consideration. It further
assumes that there is good communication between policy makers and those who
implementor deliver the policy; This-is not always the case..
Firstly, there are cases where the policy is not developed from within the company and
so it may not be effective in the sense that the particular needs and problems of the
company may not have been addressed in an informed manner. This happens for example
when the policy comes from the regional office of a company and is supposed to filter
down to the rest of the branches which may be different in the sense of demographics,
budget and capacity. The policy may not be completely applicable in such instances.
There is also room for misinterpretation of the content or aims of the policy. This may
even be worse where the guide for action is taken to be a document that was developed at
a national level. The question of how specific this policy is comes to mind and how
applicable it is to a particular company. Even when the policy is developed within the
company, there may be a difference in perception between the management and the rest
of thestaft' so that there is a lack of cOnsensus and understanding, "What ifworkers do·
not share the objectives oftheir superiors? Lower level participants in organisations often
do not share the perspectives and preferences of their superiors and hence in some
respects cannot be thought to be working toward state agency goals." (Lipsky, 1980:16).
Development of policy without consulting those who are to deliver it may be a limiting
factor when it comes to implementation. Sometimes there is a feeling that management is
going about tackling the problem in the wrong way and people at lower levels of the
hierarchy may feel that higher- level officials are too far removed from the reality of the
situation. This may cause resentment or frustration. The top down approach of policy
making may not be very effective, "One can expect a certain degree ofnon compliance if
lower level workers' interests differ from the interests of those at higher levels and the
incentives arid sanctions available to higher levels are not sufficient to prevail." (Lipsky,
1980:17). Non cOmpliance may also result from racial tensions. This may be particularly
relevant to this area of policy making. mY/AIDS is defined in terms of race and class
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and this undoubtedly compounds the complexity of the attempts to deal with it Black
people implementing policy may be resentful and may feel that too little is being done to
deal with the disease. This may influence the way they deliver policy. On the other hand,
white people may -feel that the company's'resources cannot be spent on trying to
intervene in a personal health issue that is intimately tied to cultural practice. This
difference in perception may cause discrepancies in how a policy is implemented. This is
a situation that is rife for individuals to take matters into their own hands and implement
the policies or general guidelines as they see fit. The bottom- up approach involves
negotiation and consensus and recognises the fact that implementation may not always
proceed as prescribed by the policy.
Another factor that may limit the rationality of the responses ofcompanies to ffiV/AIDS
is the filet that·human beings tend to resist change and try to maintain the status quo.
Because human beings are creatures of habit and routine, companies may feel that it is
simpler and more straight- forward to place mv/AIDS within th~ context of a broader
and previously existing health policy. This was a common occurrence among the
companies in the sample. However, the point is that mY/AIDS is a disease to which a lot
ofstigma is attached. Further, it is a multifilceted problem with serious consequences on a
large scale. This in itself should guarantee its unique status. The reluctance to
acknowledge this met in the mce of overwhelming evidence of the seriousness of the
issue may prevent a rational response to it.
There is also a question of the psychological barriers to rationality. This was evident in
the interviews that were conducted. As we have.Seen. there was a kind ofdenial from the
management despite the fact that the d~ease was having such an impact on the
workforce. This could be .attributed to various issues, for example, a feeling of
helplessness and not knowing how to deal with the situation. It is also possible that some
were not so well informed about the nature of the disease and its likely consequences.
Thus there was the factor of ignorance. The psychological environment may also refer to
the perceptions regarding the disease- who it affects 'and why. This may really have an
impact on the response. It was found that some ofthe key informants were ofthe opinion
68
that lllV/AIDS affects people from the African group and this was linked to the cultural
practices ofthis race group. It was also found that this race group comprised workers who
were mostly unskilled or semiskilled and therefore the problem was not defined as having
reached crisis proportions"because this type of labour is easily replaceable. -
Perhaps in a cost- benefit sense certain companies felt that the cost of interventions is
higher than that of replacing workers who succumb to the illness. However, this had not
been officially evaluated. This also brings us to another point- that of the difficulty of
putting a price on various components of a scheme to manage mv/AIDS. There is a
problem of measuring variables such as loss of life. There is also the complicating factor
that'not all pains. and pleasures are equal. Can the quality of an employee's life be
measured in terms of money, benefits and the costs of rehiring? Another fundamental
question is whether or not companies do have an obligation to the employer and to what
extent this obligation reaches. When social responsibility to the individual and to society
is in opposition to the aims and profit making goals of the company, perhaps it is not
difficult to guess which will take precedence. According to the economic forecasts .
however, business will be acting in its own interests as well if the problem is tackled
now.
Ignoring the problem or having token interventions that have little impact is clearly not
the solution. A short- term solution like trying to hire people who.are not infected may
seem mtional but it is not practical. An individual's IllV/AIDS status can change at any
time, even after employment Planning for the long term is much better. The attitude that
. only unskilled workers are affected and that they are easily replaceable seems not only
callous but dangerous as well. It may give a false sense ofsecurity to businesses. This is
because according to economic forecasts skilled people will also be affected and this may .
have a great impact on business. A shortage of skills may be experienced and this will
.affect businesses that have not planned in advance.
Another limit ofrationality is the fact that consequences are not always known. However,
it is important that decision- makers take the time to get all the information that they can
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and sometimes where necessary to make educated and informed guesses or estimates. It
is recognised that unlike in other policy areas, health disasters may be more difficult to
predict as they occur gradually and over longer periods of time. Therefore, because of
. this sort of invisibility, it is -notalways easy to identify a health crisis immediately. There
is a reliance on projections and only when individual cases are aggregated into statistics
can the problem'seem compelling. Thus, mtional analysis may be difficult to carry out
due to insufficient information. We may note, for example that within the setting of a
business enterprise, skilled personnel have access to private medical care which may be
out of reach for the rank and file who may have to rely on occupational health care.
People who are financially able are more likely to successfully withhold information
regarding their status and also to afford medication that will increase their quality oflife
as well. Thus, the disease becomes a private and personal health issue. A combination of
these factors may make it difficult to determine the mte of infection among the skilled
category ofthe workforce.
Absence of this type of information may not paint an accumte picture of the situation.
This in turn may mean that the urgency may not be felt The key ~nformants, for example,
felt that mY/AIDS would pose a bigger problem in the future mther than now. Those
who were affected were easily replaceable workers and there was no sense ofurgency to
try and deal with the situation now. The costs to the company were limited or at least
much less than they would be if the skilled employees were the ones who were falling ill.
Thus, many felt that they would deal with the problem when it arose but there was some
vagueness about how this would be done. The problem ofIDV/AIDS was not seen to be
a prominent one on the agenda of most ofthe companies in the sample.
Rationality ignores the fact that there are political or social considerations that may
motivate action and these may not seem mtional at all. However, all hum8n behaviour is
goal oriented even though the purpose may not be immediately clear. These
considemtions can justify decisions already made and decision- makers may not choose
mtionally between options. If-a cOmpany decides to spend money on an intervention that
may cost a lot and may not be very effective, this may not seem mtional at all. It may be. .
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due to factors such as the political or social environment More may be spent on
interventions that are visible such as plays and visual displays so that the company can be
seen to be doing something. This does not necessarily depend on the rationality of the
intervention-·howeffective it is as compared to its cost It may'simply'be based on the
fact that it is a grand event that is visible in the community and this will cast the
organisation in a positive light Rationality can also be used to justify decisions already
made rather than to guide action. This may be due to a resistance to change and a
preference for habit or routine. At times this reluctance to explore new options even if
they are cost effective, causes companies to spend more while doing less by way of
meaningful interventions.
Rationality could also be used as an excuse for inaction. This is tied to the issue that data
is not neutral. As we have seen, rationality is bounded by the fact that indiViduals work in
different environments and have different perception ofthings. This frames the processes
of choice. The questions of how, why, when and for whom the data was collected are
. important ones.·There may be a difference in the way that black and white people react to
the data. The fact that current data shows a greater impact ofthe disease among members
of the African community seems to factor into the reaction of management who are
mostly white. There was vagueness when some key informants were asked ifmore would
be done by way of programmes, ifwhite people were affected as much as black people.
There was feeling from some black informants that in the face of clear evidence that the
disease was taking a great toll on the Africari workers there was complacency on the side
of management. Perhaps if there were more black people in management positions the
reaction would be a little different, presumably because black communities may be
experiencing this disease at a deeper level especially within the context of poverty. The
point is that personal experiences count and they may bring to bear on the policy process.
They may serve to bring certain issues to the limelight
Data is often collected for white people in management positions. We must realise that it
is also collected at a certain stage in the epidemic. There is expected to be an increase in
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deaths even if people change their sexual behaviour and this is because the mtes of
infection are already high. Thus, the worst is yet to come and the full brunt of the
epidemic has not been borne. Failure to realise this will have a negative impact on
companies that are not prepared.- At present there seems to be the feeling that data is .
being exaggerated and that deaths from mY/AIDS may serve the positive function of
decreasing unemployment. Whatever the issues and perceptions that surround the disease
and the interpretation of the available data, it is clear that data is very important for
decision- making and it is not neutral.
Another way in which inaction may be justified through mtionality is, for example, when
IDV/AIDS is attributed to cultural practices or defined as a personal health issue. This is
where companies may feel that meaningful interventions are costly and there is no point
of spending money on these because mY/AIDS is a problem tied to culture. Thus, the
human element again comeS in because it is a question ofhow data is interpreted. When
interventions are not seen to make an impact, one could attribute this to a number of
mctors. Either the interventions are not effective in themselves because oftheir approach,
or the people to whom the interventions are aimed are too steeped in culture to respond to
the messages they are receiving. Thus, it is a matter of interpretation. This came up in
several of the interviews. It was clear that the data was being interpreted by individuals
who were of a different race to those that were most affected by IDV/AIDS. Thus,
casting mY/AIDS as a cultural issue could justify the futility of interventions and the
- -
poor attempts to combat the disease in the workplace. It could lend credence to the filet
that compames were doing all that they could but that it was ultimately impossible to deal
with this problem effectively as it was tied to the question ofculture.
Thus, even when data is statistically accurate, it may not lead to mtional analysis. Often,
.choices are made from available alternatives that are never really exhaustive. Instead,
.they are the options that are seen to be feasible or 'good enough.' That is, politically
correct, within the bounds of legality or within the existing health budget. In an effort to
choose what is simply good enough rather than what is the best option some important
interventions may be left out A good example is the fact that the key informants reported
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that there were no signi:fi~nt efforts aimed at providing medication for opportunistic
infections. The issue of medication was also one that had been politicized. The
companies felt that these medications were too expensive to provide to employees.
However, none of the companies had calculated and compared the costs-of retraining or
rehiring against prolonging life by providing medication. These are some of the fuctors
that may be left out in the decision making process. Decisions are not made after all the
alternatives are explored and the alternatives that are left out depend on the priorities of
the particular organisation.
Another important mctor to note is that the way the problem is defined is very important
in detennining the response to it Issues gain or lose importance according to, in a
company, for example, what department they full under. The fuct that mY/AIDS was
dealt with under the Personnel Department, which more often than not relegated it to the
company clinic, shoWs that it was not such a big priority and that it did not play a
. significant part in the fonnulation of the company strategy. Few companies had policies
specific to mv/AIDS and there were no significant resources put aside for this particular
issue. Other than falling within a department, and not commanding a specialised team or
section of it's own, lITV/AIDS was more often than not defined as any other major
illness. In light of the fuct that this disease is unique and may have major institutional
impacts, this definition ofIDV/AIDS relegates it to a position ofless significance than is
required for a rational response to be planned.
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- CONCLUSION
The issue ofHIV/AIDS is a complex one. It is not merely a personal health issue. It is a
developmental issue and could turn- -into a- national calamity in South Africa- with a
bearing on the way that companies function. Thus, there may be a major institutional
impact with real economic implications.
With this in mind, it is important for companies in South Africa to formulate workable
strategies to deal with this problem. Most of the companies in this study did not have
policies specific to InV/AIDS. Neither did they have specific funds allocated to realising
the-programmes that were in place. The most sustained intervention was the provision of
condoms, the success ofwhich had not been evaluated, but was in doubt according to the
responses of the key informants. All the other interventions were unsystematic and
intermittent Nevertheless, many of the key informants felt that they were successful,
despite a lot of evidence to the contrary. This perhaps due to the met that there were no
predetermined criteria for determining the success of the interventions in addition to the
fact that there was a contradictory and messy understanding of the issues surrounding
H;IV/AIDS. Also, there was d'enial and this translated into an insufficient social response.
These are some ofthe factors that will prevent a rational response from companies.
The rational choice model does seem to aid in our understanding ofthe policy process but. -
perhaps only when we realise that it works together with other human factors. Rational
decision making -is limited, as we have seen, it). various ways. People may not share a
similar definition of the mY/AIDS problem. Perceptions may differ as a result of
personal fuctors that influence opinions- race, gender, personal experience, values and '
'prejudices. Therefore,' the result is often a less pure form of cost-benefit analysis,
coloured, or bounded by'these metors.
Moreover, there is, as we have seen an organisational context and this too determines
how the reaction will be and how the analysis of the problem will be carried out It is
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important to know the goals and objectives of the organisation as well as what issues are
defined as ofa high priority.
Implementation is hampered and may be impossible where resources are not sufficient to
meetpolicy demands. This is another fuctorthat will limit rationality.- Human behaviour.
is goal oriented and will involve some weighing ofcost and benefits ofvarious courses of
action. What is important to realise is that it is almost impossible to come up with the
perfect solution. This is because of all the limits to ratiqnality that we have encountered
in :the course of this study- psychological, political, social and economic. These limit
rationality and affect decision- making. There is also the question of limited cognitive
capacity as a barrier to rationality. This we have seen in the seemingly overwhelming
nature of the mY/AIDS problem so that many respondents were not aware of how to
react
Perhaps it is true to say that, "Strategies that aim at perfect rationality are plausible and
appealing but they seem virtually impossible to execute. There is not one single strategy
that can guarantee that it will lead to the discovery of the best available
aliematives....discovery requires an imaginative search. There is then, in political
analysis, an indispensable need for the informed imagination; for speculation guided by
knowledge... Jor the willingness to think hard about unthinkable alternatives and the all
too easily thinkable solutions. There is in short a need for a creative search inspired by
the hunch that somewhere between the unattainable best and the kind of mediocrity so
often attained in political matters there lies a universe of better alternatives- and worse
ones too- all waiting to be·explored. (Dahl, 1991: 143).
Whatever the case it is clear that the companies here have to better understand the issues
at hand so that they are better placed to respond. Without this basic knowledge, any type





KI-A from a shipping company, Durban, 14th September 2000.
. . th
KI-B from a company that manufactures brake pads, Durban, 14 September 2000.
KI-C from a company dealing with social issues, Durban, 3rd October 2000.
KI-D from a. newspaper company, Durban, lOth October 2000.
KI-E from an aluminium plant, Pietemaritzburg, 13 th November 2000.
KI-F from a company that manufactures chip board, Pietennaritzburg, 16th November
2000.
KI-Gfrom a packaging plant, Pietermaritzburg, 21 lit Novemeber 2000.
KI-H from a chemical plant, Durban, 24th November 2000.
KI-I from a retail company, Pietermaritzburg, 27th November 2000.
KI-J from a company dealing with water management, Pietermaritzburg, 27th November
2000.
KI-K from a company that manufactures wax and oil byproducts, Pietennaritzburg, 27th
November 2000.
KI-L from a company that manufactures animal feed; Pietennaritzburg, 28th November
WOO .
KI-M from a maize mill, Pietennaritzburg, 28th November, 2000.
KI-N from a supermarket, Pietennaritzburg, November 30th 2000.
KI-O from a retail company, Pietermaritzburg, November 30th 2000.
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APPENDIX ONE: QUESTIONNAIRE
HIV and AIDS in Enterprises in Kwalulu Natal
1. Name ofcompany
'0' •••••••••••••••••• '0' •••••••••••••••••• '0' 0 ••••••••••• 0. '0 •••••• , ••••••••••••• 0 ••••• 0. '0' ••• 00'
2. Type ofcompany
.......................... '0' •••• ' ••••••••••••••••••• '0 ••••• 0' ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• '.' .'0 ••••••• 0.
3. Number ofemployees
4. Skill composition ofworkforce
......... skilled semi-skilled unskilled
5. Gender composition ofworkforce
6. Racial composition ofworkforce
......... White Coloured " Indian African .
7. Do you have an age profile ofemployees? Please attach
'0 •••••••••••••• 0 ••••••• '" '0 •••••••••••••••••••• 0' •••••••••••••••••• '" •••••••••••••••••• '0' •••••••••••• "'0
I am going to talk to you about mv and AIDS as it affects your organisation.
8. How do you understand the problem ofInV and AIDS?
'0 , •••••••••••••••••• '0' ••••••••• '0' '0' •••••• '" ••• ' •• '" '0'
.' .
... '" .
'" '" " .
.... ., , '" '" '" ' '.' .
......... ... .... . ... ...... ..................... .... .... . .. .... . ..... .. .. .... . .. ...~ .
9. What do you feel is the biggest challenge mv and AIDS poses to your organisation? .
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.. , ., .
., , " .
... .. , .
... .. .... ... ...... . ~. ...... ... ...... .. .... ... ... ... ...... ... ... .. . .. .... ...... ... . " ... ... ...... ... ...... ...
.... '" , .
... '.' " .
12. What, ifany intervention programmes do you have? Please describe these in detail.
(Where is it directed? -within the organisation; in employee communities; in the
broader society, ffiV testing and counseling (who provides the service?» .
•• • • • • • • • • •• • •• • •• • • • • •• I ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• '.' •• ' .•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
... " " .
... ...... ... ... ... ~ .
... .. , , '" '" .
... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ' .
••• '" I , '" ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
... ." " '"
- -
'" " " .
81
13. What about interventions to manage my, to deal with opportunistic infections, to
prepare for death ete)
'0' .0 •• 0 '0' .0' .0. '0' 0 ••••••••• 0 e" '0' '0' .0' '0' '0' .'0 '0' '0 ••••••• '0' .0 •• 0 •• 0 ••••• 0 •• 0 •• 0 •••• '0 ••••.
• 0 •••••••.••• '0 •• 0' .0 ••••• 0' .0 , •• 0 •••.• '0' .0' '0' •••• 0' •••••••••• 0' '0' ••• '0' ••• '0' '0' '0' .0. '0' '0' .0.
'0' '0 •••••••••••••• 0' .0. '0' .0' .0' ••• '0 •• , •• 0' •••• 0' .0. '0' ••• "0' '0 •••• '0 •• 0. '0' .0 •••• '0' .0' '0. '0' .0 •• 0' '0 •• '0
'0' •••••• '0' '0. '0. '0' '0. '0' '0 •• 0' .0. '0. '0' '0' .0 •• 0. '0' .0 •• 0' .0' ••• '0 ...... 0' .0 •• 0 •••• '0' '0' ••• '0' '0' '0 •• 0. '0.
14. How did you come to develop this policy and/or intervention programme? (Is it
something you developed in an ad hoc way from experience; did you get outside help
from whom, was capacity built within the organisation generally or was it division
directed etc.).
••• '0' '0' '0' '0' •.•••••••••••••• '0' .0 ••••••••••••• '0. '0' .0. '0. o.o.o. •• o. •• o. .o. ••••••••••• o.o. ••••••••••••••••••••••••
15. Have you allocated specific financial and personnel resources to realise your
policy/programmes (department, level% within the department, level % ofoverall
budget, amount).
' ' " .
••• ••• ••• ••• o. •• o.' ••• o. •• o. •••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••• o. ••••••••••••••••• o. •••• o. ••• '.o. •••••••••••• _•••
••• • o. •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 'o. •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
... ... ..................... ........... ....... .... ... ...... ...... ... ...... ... ... ...... ......... ......... .. ....
• • •••••••••• o. ~ ••••••.••••• o. o.o. ••• o.! •••••••••••••••••••••••••
•••.••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• 'o. ••••••••••••••••• ' •••••••••••••••• " .
o. •••••••••••• o. .
••• ••• ••• ••• ••• • ' •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• " ••••••••• o. ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• o. •••••••••••
••• ••• •• t t •••••••••••••••••••• t •••••••••••••••••••• o. •••••• ' •••••• ' o.. '.' .' .
••• ••• • t •••• o. ••• t •••••••••• o. •• '.' •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ' :
................... o. ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ' •••••••• o. ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
82
16. Do you think that your policies and progmmmes are effective? (why do you say this,
in what way, what's missing)
... " , .. , , , , .
... , , , , .
... .. , , .
... .. , '" '" .
... ., '" .
17. Given the scale ofthe HIV epidemic and its now recognised economic and social
impacts, do you think your programmes and policies are up to the task to keep your
organisation in business?
................. 0 ' .
••• ••• •• 0 "" .0 ••••••••••• '.0 •••• 0' 0 •••••••••••••••••• 0 0 ••••••••• e •••••••••••
••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• e' 0 ••••••• 0 ••••••••••• 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 ••• 0 .
••• ••• ••• •• 0 0 '0 •••••••••••••••••••
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